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Network mapping technologies allow quick and easy discovery of computer systems
throughout a network. Active mapping methods, such as using nmap, capitalize on the
standard stimulus-response of network systems to probe target systems. In doing so, they
create extra traffic on the network, both for the initial probe and for the target system’s
response. Passive mapping methods work opportunistically, listening for network traffic as
it transits the system. As such, passive methods generate minimal network traffic overhead.
Active methods are still standard methods for network information gathering; passive
techniques are not normally used due to the possibility of missing important information
as it passes by the sensor. Configuring the network for passive network mapping also
involves more network management.
This research explores the implementation of a prototype passive network mapping
system, lanmap, designed for use within an Internet Protocol-based local area network.
Network traffic is generated by a synthetic traffic generation suite using honeyd and syntraf,
a custom Java program to interact with honeyd. lanmap is tested against nmap to compare
the two techniques.
Experimental results show that lanmap is quite effective, discovering an average of
76.1% of all configured services (server- and client-side) whereas nmap only found 27.6%
of all configured services. Conversely, lanmap discovered 19.9% of the server services while
nmap discovered 92.7% of the configured server-side services. lanmap discovered 100% of
all client-side service consumers while nmap found none. lanmap generated an average
of 200 packets of network overhead while nmap generated a minimum of minimum 8,600
packets on average–up to 155,000 packets at its maximum average value.
The results show that given the constraints of the test bed, passive network mapping
is a viable alternative to active network mapping, unless the mapper is looking for unused
server-side services.
x
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ACTIVE AND PASSIVE
MAPPING TECHNIQUES IN AN INTERNET-BASED LOCAL
AREA NETWORK
1. Introduction
With the ever increasing requirements placed on network administrators due
to mission needs and the reliance on networks and network-based systems, network
and network security administrators cannot afford to be ignorant of the systems
connected to their networks. It is paramount they maintain a comprehensive view
of their areas of responsibility. One technique available to them is network mapping.
Network mapping is a discovery process enumerating network devices and the services
provided by those systems. With this information, a network administrator can
determine if there have been significant changes to the network and take action to
resolve discrepancies.
1.1 Background
There are two basic types of network mapping, active and passive. Active
methods rely on a stimulus-response from network systems. The active mapper
sends special probes to target systems and awaits an expected response and builds
a map based on those responses (or lack thereof). A passive mapper simply listens
to traffic on the network and builds a map based on the normal interaction of client
and server systems in the network.
Active network mapping creates network overhead by sending probes to target
systems which further elicit a response. Passive methods rely solely on the traffic
already on the network and introduce little, if any, overhead onto the network.
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1.2 Research Problem
This research compares these two techniques and performs a side-by-side com-
parison to determine which is more accurate and which has less network overhead.
This research explores both techniques, using a freely available, “off-the-shelf” pro-
gram representative of the active mapping technique. A passive technology is rep-
resented by a custom system that includes a network sensor and a data collector
to provide the mapping to a user. Both approaches are compared in a simulated
network environment and quantified results to the comparison question generated.
1.3 Scope
The scope of this research is limited to examining the results of active and
passive network mapping systems. nmap is selected as the active mapping tool due
to its overwhelming popularity and its widespread use. Since no passive mapping
system is easily available that meets the needs of this research, a custom system is
constructed.
Both systems are presented with identical networks on which to perform their
mapping function. Results of the mapping are compared statistically using accuracy
and efficiency as metrics. Accuracy metrics capture the correctness and complete-
ness of the mapping. Efficiency metrics describe the amount of network overhead
generated by the different techniques.
1.4 Approach
This investigation uses empirical results of real systems in operation. Using
freely available software and standard desktop computer systems, an experimental
test bed is built. This test bed provides facilities for both the active and passive
mapping system to perform their task in a realistic yet controlled environment. The
custom passive mapping system is developed using freely available components and
libraries. A client-server network environment is constructed, complete with network
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traffic for the passive mapper to examine and the active mapper to contend with.
Finally, trials are run using various configurations and time frames to gather metrics
used for comparison.
The network is based on honeyd, an open-source honeypot program, to provide
virtual machines for the server-side environment and a custom traffic generator to
interact with those servers.
1.5 Summary
The remainder of this document is organized into four chapters. Chapter 2 con-
tains the literature review where background associated with the Internet Protocol
(IP) and mapping methods are discussed. The methodology for the experimental
phase of this investigation is given in Chapter 3. The analysis of the results and
comparison between active and passive techniques follow in Chapter 4. Finally,
Chapter 5 provides a summary of the thesis effort and identifies areas of the research
to be explored in future research efforts.
3
2. Background / Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an overview to network mapping techniques. Section 2.2
describes network mapping in general. Section 2.3 provides definitions of terms as
they apply to this research and Section 2.4 discusses reasons for and the uses of net-
work mapping. Section 2.5 describes active mapping techniques in common use while
Section 2.6 reveals advantages and disadvantages of those techniques. Section 2.7 de-
scribes some passive methods and Section 2.8 defines drawbacks of passive methods.
Finally, Section 2.9 discusses other research in these and related areas.
2.2 Description
With the massive growth of and dependence on computer networks and the
Internet for e-commerce and mission-critical command-and-control messaging, those
same computer networks have greatly increased in capabilities to accommodate in-
creased network traffic. This increased need has led to higher levels of complexity
as these networks and network systems have spread and grown over time. Thus,
management and control of the enterprise network has also become quite complex.
Network mapping techniques give network managers and network security personnel
the capability to know, discover and understand their network topology, the services
that their systems provide, and the location and types of consumers of those services.
There are a number of mapping techniques currently being used in production en-
vironments such as Hewlett-Packard’s OpenView (HPOV) Network Node Manager
(NNM) [31] and Ipswitch’s WhatsUp Gold [13], all of which are stimulus-response
or active systems. Passive mapping methods are not being widely used in produc-
tion networks. This chapter discusses the importance of network mapping, currently
used and proposed methods and techniques, the success expectancy and potential
limitations hindering implementation.
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2.3 Definition of Network Mapping and Network Maps
To alleviate confusion, “network mapping” will be explicitly defined. According
to Merriam-Webster, a network is defined as “a system of computers, terminals, and
databases connected by communications lines” [9] whereas a mapping is defined as
(in this context) “to make a survey of for or as if for the purpose of making a
map” [9]. So, a definition of network mapping could be “a survey of a system of
computers, terminals, and databases for the purpose of making a map.” While this
definition is close to what is needed, the definition is modified to suit the purposes
of this investigation:
Network mapping is the information gathering process by which infor-
mation about a network is collected regarding its topology, its systems
and the services those systems provide.
Other related definitions are given to provide a fuller understanding of this
investigation. These definitions are:
Client : a computer program, which accesses a service and typically pro-
vides a user interface for that service.
System: any device which can load and execute programs.
Network System: the computers, networks, clients and servers which
encompass the actions, tasks, and programs to be executed.
Server : a system which provides services to clients.
Service: a computer program which provides a given information resource
to a client (i.e., e-mail service or web service).
Accuracy : a measure of the correctness of mapping decisions.
Efficiency : used to describe the network overhead the mapping algo-
rithm induces to perform its job. The fewer packets introduced into the
network, the more efficient the algorithm is.
Using these definitions, a “client system” is nothing more than a system which
loads a client program and uses it to access a service.
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2.4 Why Network Mapping?
A network map provides simplified understanding of a complex system or net-
work of systems. The age-old cliché of “a picture is worth a thousand words” cer-
tainly applies here. Using spreadsheets or databases to track and represent network
system configurations simplifies the management of that information via automated
means. This type of information may mean little to the network manager must
understand the systems under his/her control. Therefore, if the information is re-
duced to its essence–that representative information the network manager needs to
understand–and represented it in a way which is easily grasped and readily under-
standable, a complex system is simplified.
Useful network maps have several properties in common. They are typically
pictorial in nature and provide an overview of the systems that comprise the net-
work. However, depending on the experience or working-level of the person using
it–technician or manager–the network map could be a simple list of network systems
and specific, critical attributes. Probably the most important piece of information
on a network map is the function of a given network device. A network map should
also disclose the system’s type without confusion. Most network mapping tools like
the aforementioned WhatsUp Gold and Network Node Manager represent the system
type with standardized pictures or icons. However, it is up to the network adminis-
trator to configure the visual portion of network maps appropriately for the type of
equipment.
Another important representation is the system location within the network.
The topology of enterprise networks is typically hierarchical in nature, with the pri-
mary service-providing systems on a few network segments (for redundancy and load
balancing) and the client workstations spread throughout other segments within the
enterprise. Other information is and will be available via the map, but these two
pieces of information are those that interest both network administrators and man-
agers. The network administrator needs to know what systems are doing on his/her
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network (regarding interoperability, or the effect of new systems on the network as
a whole, etc). Managers want to keep track of how many systems are online and
their functions for inventory, cost, manpower levels, and budget planning for future
systems.
Network mapping also aids the network technician for remotely administered
networks. Managing networks remotely is a difficult task because of the lack of direct
supervision and physical control of those networks. However, remote administration
is becoming more and more popular by organizations that have a small cadre of
network and system savvy individuals and numerous enterprises to run. Indeed, that
is the thrust of the network consolidation effort going on throughout the Air Force–
consolidation of common services by the major commands [4,24]. Administrators of
these systems remotely manage and monitor critical systems at the Air Force bases
under their control. A standardized and accurate network map of the systems at
their remote sites provides administrators consistent information.
Finally, network maps and network mapping play a large role in the hacker
and information warfare community. Tools and techniques developed over time en-
able these individuals to quickly and easily perform reconnaissance on an adversary’s
network. This information gives the attacker a “footprint” of the topology of the
enemy’s network and knowledge of critical systems within that network. The tech-
niques and tools in-use are primarily active methods.
2.5 Active Network Mapping Techniques
Network mapping techniques fall into one of two broad categories: active and
passive. Active techniques involve a person or process who actively probes a net-
work to elicit information. Active techniques typically rely on stimulus-response–the
network or network system responds to a stimulus given by the network mapping
process. Passive techniques simply “listen in” and do not actively probe the network.
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The simplest technique (and perhaps the most primitive method of active map-
ping) is a hands-on inventory of all systems connected to the network. While archaic
compared to the techniques discussed later, this still remains a viable option. In-
deed, Automated Data Processing Equipment (ADPE) custodians throughout the
Air Force must perform a hands-on inventory of their computer-related assets at
least once yearly, a tedious and often arduous task [25]. While performing this task,
the ADPE custodian, either with pen and paper or by automated process, collects
information to build a network map. In fact, this technique provides more informa-
tion than the automated methods listed below. The ADPE custodian is supposed
to provide physical and environmental attributes of a given system. Specific infor-
mation includes the system’s owner or primary user, and the location (building and
office) in which it is located. This is a daunting task, especially when users move
computers without the custodian’s knowledge. Simpler, more automated methods
are needed and luckily, are available.
Next on the complexity level would be a ping sweep. The ping command works
much like sonar–sending out a signal and waiting for the echo of that signal to return.
Using the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) Echo function, ping sends a
single, serial-numbered packet to a given address [41]. If a host exists at that address,
it is supposed to reply, as required by the Internet Protocol (IP) standard, to the
originator using the same serial number [42]. The ping command gives the network
mapper one important piece of information: whether a system exists at a given IP
address. A ping sweep extends the ping model and uses a simple looping technique
to ping all of the addresses within a given IP address range. The sweep typically
encompasses an entire network. Ping sweeps are simple to implement because the
ping command is a common part of the IP protocol suite that exists on Internet
capable systems. A simple script can use the ping command, iterate through the
given addresses, and save the results in a log file for later perusal by an individual
or an automated system.
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The primary drawback to this technique is that quite a few administrators
disable or block ICMP echo packets at their border gateways or even within their
metropolitan area networks (MANs) or LANs. As a result, this technique cannot be
used on those networks. Second, the system being probed must respond to the echo
request. The given system could simply be turned off, as is the case for workstations
which are routinely shutdown at the end of the workday. They could even be con-
figured not to answer the ping request. Finally, the ping sweep doesn’t reveal much
more information than “exists and answering.”
When used in a “local” network, one which the administrator has control, a
ping sweep is a fast and effective method of finding out which IP addresses within the
network are in use by hosts. The administrator is able to reach out and “touch” sys-
tems via the network without obstacles. When used against an adversary, however,
this becomes a tricky matter. As stated above, security-minded network adminis-
trators often block ICMP messages at the network border router or gateway firewall
to keep outsiders from gaining information about their network. Even if a system
does respond, it could be a false flag, or even a honeypot designed to draw attention
away from actual production network resources [50]. Results of a ping sweep against
an adversary should be used with a great deal of skepticism.
Another standard tool built upon the ICMP protocol is traceroute. traceroute
uses the Time-To-Live (TTL) field present in every IP packet. The TTL is simply a
network “hop” counter. Every device along a packet’s path automatically decrements
the packet’s TTL. When the counter reaches zero, the network device is supposed to
ignore or drop that packet and send an ICMP Time Exceeded message back to the
originator, giving it the chance to take further action with that packet [41, 42]. By
starting with a TTL of one, and incrementing one hop at a time, the traceroute utility
can send an IP packet destined for a target address and keep track of the systems
that report ICMP Time Exceeded for each “hop distance” [3]. Thus, traceroute can
be used to discover the topology of the network. By using the list of active hosts
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generated by a ping sweep, the network mapper can discover the pathways between
various machines on the network. When using the traceroute command, a mapper
tracks nodes which are repeated when contacting different hosts and can determine
where primary nodes (i.e., routers) are throughout the network. Thus, the mapper
can build a hierarchical topology of systems and network devices which support those
systems.
Using traceroute in a LAN or MAN which a network manager has absolute
control over makes for quick discovery of those network devices and the routes in-
formation takes through the network. When used against an adversary, this method
works only as well as that adversary’s network administrator permits. Simply block-
ing the ICMP Time Exceeded from traversing out a network keeps traceroute from
working against the devices within the network. However, that same network trace
information can give a good picture of the interconnection of these systems and the
critical paths which the network needs to function.
Researchers at Lumeta Corp have devised an automated way to use traceroute
to generate map data and then create visualizations of the Internet from that data.
Termed “peacock maps,” their stunning visualizations have actually become quite
popular within the Internet community and are being sold on-line to enthusiasts and
art galleries alike [17].
Similar research is being conducted by the“skitter” project developed by the
Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) [33]. This tool maps
the Internet using round-trip time calculations to over half a million Internet devices
around the world. It provides a picture of the topological connectivity of the Internet,
but doesn’t go the next step of discovering services. Granted, for the scale of their
project, gathering “services-provided” data for 500,000 hosts would be impractical,
at least on a frequent and recurring basis. Furthermore, this mapping technique
doesn’t “discover” new information about the network, simply the topology to known
10
machines [33]. Indeed, discovery of the millions of nodes throughout the entire
Internet would be a vast undertaking in and of itself.
Moving up the network stack to the transport layer, the Transmission Con-
trol Protocol (TCP) provides a standard method of end-to-end connections using
the IP protocol. TCP guarantees message delivery and “in-order” packet delivery.
The TCP layer further separates a given IP address into sub-addresses called ports.
Consider an apartment building analogy: the address specifies the building location
while the apartment number tells the exact location of an individual. IP addresses
are equivalent to the apartment building address and ports are equivalent to the
apartment number. In TCP, the port address is a 16-bit value. Therefore, the ports
take on decimal values between 1 through 65535 (port 0 is not normally used). Each
port number represents a service provided by a server. Ports 1-1024 are reserved for
well-known services. For instance, the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), the
de-facto standard for passing electronic mail, is typically found at port 25 and Hy-
pertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP, the protocol of the world-wide web), is typically
found at port 80 [45]. “Typically” is used because a savvy network administrator
can change the ports from their default values to keep an adversary, or curious user,
guessing.
When a service is running and attached to its specified port, the service is con-
sidered to be “listening” on that “open” port–it is listening to the network for a con-
nection request by a client. During the setup of a TCP connection, the two systems
creating the connection execute a three-way handshake. The system initiating the
connection, usually a client system in the client-server model, begins the handshake
by sending a synchronize (SYN) message which, among other things, identifies the
port to which it wants to connect. The service provider acknowledges the handshake
by replying to the client with a synchronize and acknowledge (SYN|ACK) message.
The initiating system completes the handshake with an acknowledgement (ACK)
message. It is at this point that the higher-level protocol may begin to exchange
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information. A similar tear-down handshake is required to remove this connection
when the transaction completes. If the server doesn’t have a listening service on
the requested port, it is supposed to reply with a reset (RST) message after the
initial SYN. That is, both sides abort the connection before it has begun–no further
messages need to be exchanged [43].
Using this protocol knowledge, a program can be written to perform what
has been termed a port scan. The program performs a three-way handshake on all
available ports either using a predefined list of IP addresses or building one on the
fly (using a technique similar to a ping sweep). When the server completes the three-
way handshake, the port scanning program knows the server has an open or listening
port and, potentially, which service that server is providing. The process of initiating
and tearing down the connection requires a minimum of seven packets–three for the
initial handshake and four for the tear-down [43]. To omit the extra packets for the
tear-down, once the port scanner receives the SYN|ACK message and knows that the
server has a service listening, it can answer the third part of the handshake with a
RST message which, as stated above, aborts the connection. Therefore, it only takes
three packets to determine whether a given port is open. This reduces the number of
packets that cross the network. As an example port scan tool, nmap is an extremely
popular port scanner available for multiple operating systems. Its technology has
been incorporated as an integral part of several commercial and commercial-quality
network inspection and network defense tools [56]. Figure 2.1 shows a typical nmap
run on a single system.
One side-benefit of a port scan is the knowledge of how the probed system
responds to the scan. Using the TCP header fields and the flags within those fields,
coupled with prior experimental knowledge, nmap can often determine the operating
system/platform of the host system, solely based on how it replies. nmap could (but
currently does not) make similar guesses based on the services it finds open (e.g., Mi-
crosoft uses several specific ports to provide file and printer resource sharing, which
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C:\ > nmap -sS -P0 -p 1-2048 -O -T 3 192.168.0.37
Starting nmap V. 3.00 ( www.insecure.org/nmap )
Interesting ports on SERVER (192.168.0.10):








Remote operating system guess: Windows Me, Win 2000, or WinXP
Nmap run completed – 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 1 second
Figure 2.1: nmap execution [56]
other operating systems do not ordinarily use). This process is often called “finger-
printing” the host’s operating system. As a network administrator, this information
is quite useful for managing a homogeneous network. When used in multiple session
over time, a network administrator can discover new systems, and possibly new ser-
vices, within the network. Non-standard or unauthorized operating systems within
the network can also be discovered.
A more aggressive operating system fingerprinter is Xprobe. Instead of the
brute force methods of a port-scanner, Xprobe sends a minimal number of specially
crafted ICMP packets to the target system to determine key aspects of the system
and then crafts its next packet to refine its information. While still using a signature-
based database to match against, it uses “fuzzy logic” to make decisions about how
well the signature matches its database entries and streamlines the probing packets
to better fit the guess [15]. Note, however, that Xprobe only fingerprints systems–it
does not map services to systems like nmap.
When used against an adversary, a network aggressor can use the results of
fingerprinting to focus an attack. Given a particular operating system (or class of
operating systems), the aggressor can determine whether or not a certain vulnera-
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bility exists and possible exploits of the adversarial system. For instance, if a system
is fingerprinted as a Windows 2000 Server, it is unlikely that an exploit against a
Cisco Ethernet switch would be effective, leading the network warrior down a more
fruitful path with more effective exploits.
Another pseudo-active technique uses the Simple Network Management Proto-
col (SNMP). SNMP is an application-layer communication protocol used as a method
of managing TCP/IP networks, including individual network devices, and devices in
aggregate [27]. SNMP also reverses the client-server architecture. A network mon-
itoring workstation or server is actually the client requesting information while an
SNMP agent resides and runs on the system to be monitored, answering requests
for information and performing functions on the specific system. The protocol al-
lows a network programmer to peruse specific data about networked systems. Since
device enumeration was a commonly performed task, the tool snmpwalk was devel-
oped. snmpwalk uses the SNMP “GET” and “GETNEXT” requests to connect to a
SNMP-enabled system. It enumerates all of that system’s SNMP variables and their
contents, effectively dumping the entire contents of the SNMP agent’s database. A
sample snmpwalk command and its results are shown in Figure 2.2, below.
> snmpwalk -Os -c public zeus system
sysDescr.0 = “SunOS zeus.net.cmu.edu 4.1.3 U1 1 sun4m”
sysObjectID.0 = OID: enterprises.hp.nm.hpsystem.10.1.1




sysServices.0 = 72 [snm2002]
Figure 2.2: snmpwalk execution [38]
This process provides a great deal of information which can be used by the
network mapper to create detailed maps of the network. The primary drawback is
that every system included in the mapping process requires a properly configured
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SNMP agent to respond to the monitoring station. Thus, the network administrator
requires physical or remote control of the system in order to provide the correct
information and passwords into the systems. The use of SNMP can grow unwieldy if
the network manager is expected to configure the whole enterprise for SNMP, down to
individual workstations. Consider an Air Force base as large as Travis Air Force Base.
Its 10,000 person population requires over 5,000 computer systems, client and server
alike, to keep its people on the network. Usually, only those critical systems (e.g.,
electronic mail servers, gateway routers, server-side Ethernet switches, etc.) under
the system and network administrator’s direct control are configured with an SNMP
agent for monitoring and control, greatly simplifying configuration management of
those systems and the SNMP configuration in general. Configuring a large system
of network devices to work with SNMP is both an intimidating and highly political
tasking due to the large number of hosts and organizational spans of control the
system crosses. SNMP also allows changes to be made on SNMP-enabled systems
(if the agent and its configuration on that system support and allow it). Indeed,
hackers and adversaries can exploit SNMP in order to send commands to cause
critical systems to fail. SNMP requires a great deal of understanding as well as a
security-minded individual to provide strong protection against external or internal
invaders.
2.6 Strengths and Weaknesses of Active Mapping
Active techniques are a boon for network administrators. Using all of the above
techniques, Hewlett Packard’s OpenView - Network Node Manager automatically
discovers, maps and tracks systems and network devices throughout the network. It
uses a combination of active techniques during its network discovery process. “An
ICMP ping is issued for each device ... and an snmpwalk command is issued to
gather information about each discovered device” [31].
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Active methods are accurate. A ping can tell the mapper whether or not
a system exists as well as the address of that system. It can infer the network
address based on its address and can determine where that system lies within the
network hierarchy. Using nmap’s port-scanning and operating system fingerprinting
techniques, the mapper can further refine the data within the map and provide
an accurate picture of the network at hand, the services it provides and a basic
topology. In general, if a machine is providing a service, active techniques will find
it. These techniques are listed as the second step of exploration in Hacking Exposed
as a primary information gathering technique against an adversary’s systems [47].
Active methods don’t require a great deal of configuration. As long as systems
are left in their default configuration (i.e., not configured to block ports and allow
ICMP echo messages to flow), a single command line can generate most, if not all
of the data needed to generate a cohesive network map. There is no need to touch
each machine (either through the network or via hands-on) to enable an active scan
of that system. This is especially helpful when the mapping target is an adversary’s
system.
Active methods are quick. It only takes one round-trip time from the mapper
to the target to determine the existence of a system and one more round-trip time to
determine if a given service port is listening–if the probed machine isn’t configured
to drop connections to non-listening ports. With one ping packet, the mapper can
determine whether the system exists; with another three packets, it can determine
whether or not a given port is open or closed (not responding). Using nmap, a
network manager can scan the network for live systems using a myriad of functions.
Comparing multiple results over time, scans can determine if new or changed services
exist. The scan can also discover rogue system architectures–possible attempts by
an adversary to infiltrate the network, all within the round trip time of a packet to
flow across the network.
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There are drawbacks to active scanning. Probably the most obvious is that the
probe can be detected by an adversary. Active scanning techniques are analogous
to active radar or sonar; the adversary knows their system is being probed. When
a stream of ping requests or port scan packets comes from a system, two pieces of
information are conveyed. The first is the probe itself and second is the probed
system identify the source of the probe via the IP addresses. There are techniques
such as reflection or “zombied” machines which provide some anonymity for the
probe, but the adversary still knows a probe has taken place. With that knowledge,
the adversary has the capability to react to the probe. The reaction can take the
form of shutting down access by creating filters on routers and firewalls. Certain
portions of the network architecture can be changed after the probe so the systems
are not the same after the probe, rendering the data from the probe useless. If the
adversary decides to retaliate, “hack backs” or denial of service attacks could be
launched against the probing system.
These active techniques also add extra traffic to the network. In an adversarial
role, with the probe pointed outward, the additional traffic is probably a not an
issue. However, during the probe, traffic needs to exit the probe’s network, transit
through the larger Internet to the target system, then finally navigate its way back to
the probing system. This could have the effect of rendering the adversary’s network
unusable or unreachable if it becomes inundated. It could also affect the performance
of the local network during the probe, due to the exiting and returning packets
through the gateways. Connectivity to the outside network could fail due to the
overwhelming response.
When active techniques are used to scan an internal class B network of po-
tentially 65535 nodes, the network can be quickly inundated with probing packets.
For instance, in its default configuration, nmap initially attempts an ICMP ping to
check for liveness, and then scans for 1,675 well-known ports. Scanning each system
requires 3 packets x 1,675 ports or 5,025 packets. For a modest class B network
17
with 1,000 nodes, this equates to over 5 million extra packets on the network. While
most networks can easily handle that much traffic, this could overwhelm a small,
poorly implemented or hastily deployed network. In addition, a network administra-
tor might use the complete spectrum of port addresses to provide services. Indeed,
a standard scan of an Air Force base’s network infrastructure checks every port for
accessibility as well as enumerating potential system vulnerabilities using Internet
Security Scanner [26]. Therefore, there are 3 packets x 65,535 ports = 196,605 pack-
ets for one machine and 196,605,000 packets for the same 1,000 node network! A
configuration item within nmap can throttle the frequency of requests. Normally
nmap sends its next packet as soon as it receives the results from the previous one,
thereby hitting the target host with its next request. Use of this technique will keep
the mapper from overwhelming the network or any one system with packets, but
increases the completion time of the port scan.
Finally, active measures can be easily foiled. Simply setting up a firewall
around the critical network systems, especially in proxy mode–rewriting packets
instead of simply filtering and passing them on–greatly hinders active mapping.
Many operating systems now include built-in firewalls (i.e., Windows XP, Linux)
which accept only known port or IP address traffic and block active mapping.
2.7 Passive Network Mapping Techniques
Passive network mapping techniques collect the network traffic generated by
normal, day-to-day activity to form a map of the network. No extra traffic is needed
nor generated because the mapper has full access to the network traffic as it passes
through the system. Therefore, it is quite possible to use passive techniques without
detection.
Similar to active mapping, passive techniques rely on the stimulus-response of
network systems talking to one another. The stimulus is provided by the normal
activity of clients and their users, not by the third-party mapping system. While
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active techniques allow the mapper to send specially crafted packets to obtain fo-
cused information, passive techniques do not unless the passive mapper happens
to see responses to the extra active mapping traffic occurring on the network it is
monitoring.
Passive techniques should be designed to be truly passive. That is, these tech-
niques should not add traffic to the network while performing mapping duties. As
a side-effect of this approach, the passive mapper can discover low-uptime systems.
While an active measure “misses” a system because it is offline, passive techniques
would ultimately catch it when it transmits data [29]. Finally, these passive tech-
niques only detect ports and services on systems that are in use. Conversely, active
systems waste a great deal of time looking for ports that may not even be open. A
passive system can immediately determine whether a system is providing a service
on a given port. Like the active system, it can make note of a successful three-way
handshake upon connection of a client to a server and then record that server as hav-
ing the service. This is similar to the way the active port scan decides whether or
not the port is open based on a (possibly aborted) TCP connection. Since a passive
mapper receives all network traffic, it is quite possible that the mapper could miss
packets or become overwhelmed by large volume networks. There are techniques, to
be discussed further in Chapter 3, that address this problem.
A device or sensor that can observe all of the traffic coming across a network is
needed. This device is essentially a protocol analyzer, or “sniffer.” The sniffer must
be in a position within the logical network where a great deal of a given site’s traffic
and a wide range of traffic types are present to be effective. This location depends a
great deal on the purpose of the information gathering. For a friendly installation,
the sensor can be placed anywhere. Ideally, the sensor would be placed where it
could listen in on the service providers or possibly near gateways to other networks
(such as the Internet at large).
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Giovanni suggests a network choke point, such as a gateway router or firewall
for the location of the sniffer [30]. This is how an intrusion detection system (IDS) is
typically placed. The IDS monitors all traffic in- and out-bound through the network
boundary to detects from outside (or even inside) the network.
There is, however, a problem with this technique. Systems targeted for moni-
toring must have a system connection on the other side of the choke point. In other
words, by placing the sensor at the gateway border, all of the local “self” traffic of
systems is lost. Recovering the self traffic requires the sniffers to be logically close
to the server or client requesting the service.
For use in an adversarial role, the choke-point model can be flipped. Instead of
listening to traffic “departing” through the gateway, sensors are distributed through-
out the Internet in front of educational, commercial and government gateways. These
sensors listen for and analyze inbound traffic coming from an adversary’s network to
categorize the adversary’s network systems.
This leads to a number of obstacles, not the least of which is that the adversary
must connect to those institutions or corporations where the sensors are placed.
Second, getting permission for the installation of these sensors could be extremely
difficult, especially if the installation was a government-run project. Third, the
number of provided services would have to be quite diverse. Since most services
provided these days are simply web or ftp services (especially for anonymous remote
connections), a diverse set of requests may not be seen. Indeed, the only traffic
would be from systems which are acting as clients. These would be end-user systems
(normally, administrators do not use their mission-critical systems to arbitrarily “surf
the ’net”) and little would be gained. Finally, a data collection and aggregation
system is needed along with a method to get data from disparate sites to that
aggregation system to sort through the volume of data collected. Doing so would
suddenly increase the site’s network traffic by transporting information about the
incoming traffic to the aggregation point. Global organizations likely will not be
20
willing to decrease bandwidth resources and violate customer/employee privacy to
support this. However, given a diverse enough set of sites and services, this would
probably work. The Russian Federal Security Service (the successor of the KGB)
thinks so. Indeed, an AP article [48] reported that this organization has “opened a
hole” in most Russian Internet providers’ systems for monitoring and possible flow
control of system data. Not only does this organization have access to their own
citizens’ communications, but also the traffic generated by their requests and can
make inferences about the services outside of their sphere of influence. Information
gathered from these systems on the inbound side would be of great intelligence value,
if it could be captured, analyzed, and mapped.
This is similar in concept to the distributed Honeynet built by the Honeynet
Alliance [8]. While not fully implemented, the Alliance has placed production hon-
eynets and honeypots for hackers to attack in various places around the world. The
remaining step is to set up a central database, a clearinghouse, to aggregate signa-
tures and attack logs from those honeynets for further analysis for trends and the
like.
2.8 Stumbling Blocks
Passive techniques are quite functional for a local network manager who has
full control over network devices. These systems are simpler to configure and manage
than active systems because no actual configuration is necessary. Since the passive
mapper would not require any specific addressing, it could simply be plugged into
the network, turned on and begin mapping the network by listening.
However, using passive techniques against an adversary is quite problematic to
implement. While the placement of the sensor is obviously important, the amount of
traffic means absolutely nothing if the sensor cannot see any traffic (other than the
traffic destined for itself). Ethernet is a shared, broadcast medium with each node on
a segment being able to “hear” all the traffic on the wire, no matter if it is destined for
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that system or not–it is up to the network driver on each host to determine whether
or not the traffic is destined for its host. The shared medium allows a sniffer to
function. However, with the advent of layer-2 switches, every device connecting to
the switch becomes its own Ethernet segment. By default, the intelligence inside
the switch only sends packets destined for a given system to that system and does
not broadcast to all the attached systems. As a means of increasing performance by
reducing the number of collisions on an Ethernet segment, this switching technique
has decreased the ability for a sniffer to work. To overcome this, one of two things
must happen to troubleshoot a switched network. One, a non-switched hub is used,
connecting the system under test and the network sniffer to it, as well as providing
an uplink to the original switch. Thus, the hub extends the original segment so
that the sniffer can ride the same wire. This method requires physical access to the
systems and would not work in an adversarial role unless human agents infiltrate and
place these devices in the adversary’s systems. A second option is to configure the
original switch to use what Cisco Networks terms a Switched Port Analyzer (SPAN)
port [20]. With this function enabled, the given port with the sniffer attached can
be mapped to receive duplicate traffic which transits one or more of the other ports.
This allows the sniffer to see all traffic that traverses the switch. This technique
works in an adversarial role; break into the switch, reconfigure it and start listening.
An alert network administrator would notice that something had changed. In this
case, success depends on the inefficiency of the adversarial administrator.
Another problem the passive mapper experiences against an adversary is well-
administered firewalls or filtered gateways. Not only do these tools block the place-
ment of a sensor, the firewall could be configured in such a way as to keep needed
mapping data from getting out to a collection point. There are ways around this
such as using covert channels, piggy-backing data, or packets on top of other system’s
communications, but again, the adversary’s ineptitude is needed for success.
22
2.9 Relevant Research
Even though passive network mapping can provide valuable information, the
task is extremely hard to accomplish. This is a hard problem to solve for many rea-
sons, not the least of which is the placement of the sensor platform. Several research
and white papers discuss the technique of passive system fingerprinting [29,39,50,53].
This technique captures third party and the stimulus-response of normal network
communications to assess the operating system and platform of two communicating
systems. More often than not, packets are captured at a local IDS as an adversary
connects to a system or someone connects to theirs. As mentioned above, most
operating systems implement the TCP/IP stack with slight differences due to RFC
compliance, protocol optimization concerns, or simply different interpretations of
the standard. Each stack implementation can be fingerprinted based on reaction to
given packets, packet sizes, and options within those packets. Since a passive lis-
tener does not have control over system packet flow, additional information may be
needed (i.e., more similarities or more differences) to determine the characteristics of
the encountered operating system/platforms. Also of note is the fact that knowledge
is gained via the traffic which flows past the sensor. While fingerprinting is helpful,
it does not reveal which services are running on a given system.
While the above referenced works were largely theoretical, some built working
systems were built. The first, a prototype system based on Giovanni’s first paper [29],
is the program called siphon [16]. It implements a functional passive fingerprinting
system, but the developers haven’t updated it since 2000. Another, more mainstream
passive fingerprinting systems is p0f (which is a “hacker” acronym for “passive oper-
ating system fingerprinting”). This application is currently in version 2.0.3 (updated
in September 2003) and is actively maintained by Michal Zalewski [57]. It is packaged
as part of several Linux operating system distributions. Again while very helpful in
determining the probable operating system of two communicants, it does not neces-
23
sarily help in the field of mapping (although, implementing some of this code in a
mapping system might provide additional insight).
Built on the success of earlier versions of p0f and other tools, the program
ettercap [7] is a general purpose network utility. This tool has several functions
including standard network sniffing, man-in-the-middle sniffing via ARP poisoning,
and passive network mapping. The passive mapping function relies on the network
traffic being visible to the host it is running on, and does not work remotely. Not
only does it map TCP-based services to a given IP address, but it also identifies the
Ethernet address (often called the MAC–media access control–address), host names
gleaned from name service packets, and it uses an early p0f engine to fingerprint the
hosts of packets it sees.
Other research related to passive monitoring lies within the analysis of the
traffic itself, not specifically mapping topologies and the system services provided.
Brownlee [18] used passive techniques to analyze the utilization of his university’s
external link to the Internet. This research focused primarily on the Transport layer,
examining TCP and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) traffic flows. A secondary focus
investigated web-centric traffic. No attempts were made to perform mapping, only
load and flow analysis. Cohen [23] also used passive techniques (basically sniffing) to
discover differences between the observed and actual network topology. These differ-
ences were present for months in reports but analysis had not been accomplished to
reveal them. Ultimately, Cohen developed a new network map for the system to as-
sist in the troubleshooting. Finally, three studies [21,22,28] concentrated on network
sampling technologies to profile Internet traffic. These studies examined high-speed,
high-utilization links where even high-performance analysis systems failed because
of the volume of traffic that needed to be analyzed. Instead of analyzing every sin-
gle packet, the researchers looked into statistical methods and temporal analysis to
determine traffic flows. While analysis of high-speed links and characterization of
24
that traffic is important, it is not of much use to the network manager or the person
who desires to find out information about a specific network.
2.10 Summary
This chapter discussed the need for network mapping, active and passive tech-
niques in general and specific versions of those techniques in detail. Active techniques
have already proved their usefulness. Passive systems have yet to prove their worth.
There is potential in these systems that have not yet been tapped. The difficulty in




This chapter describes the thesis methodology. Section 2 describes the spec-
ification of a notional passive mapping system. Section 3 describes the design of a
custom passive mapping program. Section 4 describes the design and development
of the test-bed environment which meets the needs of both active and passive map-
pers. Section 5 discusses the design of the thesis experiments. Section 6 describes
the evaluation technique. Section 7 describes the overall experiment, including the
execution of an experimental trial.
3.2 Active Mapping
There are a number of freely and commercially available network port-scanners
which can actively map networks. However, nmap is selected in this investigation as
a representative sample–and possibly the best–of all active mapping systems. This
tool, nmap, is freely available, the source code is open to the public and it is one
of the most popular and widely-used freeware hacking tool in-use [37, 44]. nmap is
currently ranked #12 in popularity of the registered 31,708 projects on freshmeat–an
online index of Unix-based software projects [2]–and was ranked #9 in September of
2003 [55]. In fact, it has reached mainline stardom being featured as a hacker tool
in a sequence in the motion picture The Matrix Reloaded [54]. The more difficult
part of this research is finding a passive system that meets the needs of a network
administrator (or hacker).
3.3 Specification of a Passive Mapping System
A passive mapping system is needed to compare the performance of a passive
technique with that of an active one. The requirements of a notional passive mapping
system are developed, below.
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3.3.1 Functional Requirements. First and foremost, a passive mapping
system must use non-invasive means to discover information about the network.
Eliciting a reaction from the network environment by sending out specially crafted
packets not acceptable. Second, the system should provide a method for getting the
discovered information out of the network it is monitoring. This can be done with
a two-part system. First, is the sensor which listens to the network and forwards
information to a collector. The collector processes the input from the sensor and
formats the data into a readable format and/or visualization. The sensor should
be self-configuring. In other words, after connecting the system/device into a net-
work (or running the program on an existing system), the program should discover
everything it needs to operate.
Since the system must remain stealthy, the sensor cannot transmit a persis-
tent stream of information through the network. Instead, it must buffer as much
information as possible and only then send an information packet to the collector.
Built-in timers must allow an unfilled buffer to be transmitted after a given timeout
value to keep data from stagnating or getting lost due to sensor system failure. To
further optimize outbound traffic, the sensor must remember previously transmitted
items and not repeat transmission of those items. The sensor must make note of
the addresses and ports of transactions which transit outside the network bound-
aries. Then, it can masquerade as a known (and probably trusted) host inside the
network. Using such a technique may enable the sensor to more easily and stealthily
get its information past border gateways and firewalls. The collector must present
the gathered information in an appropriate manner for user viewing, whether a list
of discovered servers, clients and services or a map laying out the discovered network.
As no freely available system has been designed that meet all these specific
requirements, it is necessary to choose a subset of these requirements, find a program
which implements a portion or all of them or build a new one. This chosen subset
includes:
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• two part system,
• buffered data output,
• timer-based data output,
• non-repeated output, and
• collector formatted data for output.
3.3.2 Non-Functional Requirements. There are non-functional require-
ments for the passive mapping system. First is keeping the system as simple as pos-
sible. Learning how to write or modify a multi-threaded program is a time-consuming
process. Keeping the program single-threaded further simplifies code maintenance
later on. In addition, using external data sources, such as SQL databases or other
database techniques would depend on the system it is running on. Implementing a
full-up database is not in the best interest of a tool running in an adversarial mode,
trying to remain stealthy. Second, the program needs to be kept as small as possible.
If running on an active system in an adversary’s network, using a large number of
system resources to keep running is not recommended. The more resources con-
sumed, the higher the risk of detection. Finally, the system must be reasonably fast
in terms of execution time. A Java-based system, which uses a virtual machine,
is slower than, say, a C-language counterpart. Java is also detrimental due to the
number of resources consumed during execution. It must be fast enough to examine
inbound packets without dropping them.
3.3.3 Code Exploration. With these requirements in-hand, suitable candi-
dates for use or modification were sought. This investigation discovers the following
tools:
siphon - Multi-threaded C-language program that uses the PCAP packet cap-
ture library [34]. This particular tool is old, unsupported and marginally functional.
It is, however, the first program to implement Giovanni’s ideas about passive oper-
ating system fingerprinting [16,29]. Operating system fingerprinting, while not part
of the mapping research, would add an additional feature to the existing feature set.
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p0f - Single-threaded C-language program which uses the PCAP library. This
tool performs passive operating system fingerprinting on distant-end systems con-
necting to the fingerprinting host. This is the initial candidate.
tcpflow - Single-threaded C-language program also uses the PCAP library. The
tool stores captured packets as flows in multiple files based on end point IP addresses
and connected ports. The entire conversation between two hosts is dumped into a
file–one file per conversation–and analyzed later. Like most PCAP-based sniffers,
tcpflow can also read the input from a PCAP dump file.
ettercap - Multi-threaded interactive C-language program. This is the third
candidate after p0f and tcpflow. This tool has code for the port mapping built-
in and is a native network-sniffing tool. As an additional feature, ettercap captures
“banners” of service providers (such as the banner that an FTP server displays when
an individual logs in) which aids in discovery of services as well as fingerprinting
the operating system. ettercap uses text-based user-interface. It displays mapping
information, but requires user-interaction to fully display the information gathered
about a given host. ettercap has a command-line mode, which non-interactively logs
the gathered information. This mode displays only the Ethernet address, the IP
address and any fingerprint information it discovers. It does not display ports in-use
or the banners that it captures.
3.4 Design of a Passive Mapping System
Study of the main portion of p0f and additional study of ettercap’s dryad
module ultimately led to development of a custom program using similar techniques.
lanmap applies dryad’s mapping technique and uses the PCAP library to capture
packets.
The method ettercap’s dryad module uses is similar to nmap’s–based on the
response to stimuli given to the network device. If, upon a probe, nmap receives
a SYN|ACK response, the port is open and providing a service. If nmap instead
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receives a RST response, the port is not open. If nmap does not receive a reply
after a certain timeout period, it knows nothing new about the state of that service
or machine (unless it had earlier “detected” the machine with an ICMP ping or an-
other open port–then the port attempt would be considered “filtered” or, essentially
firewalled).
Therefore, when dryad sees a SYN packet, the source IP is usually a client
requesting a service on the destination IP’s system. Dryad does not care much
about clients; it is looking for active, responding services. So, if the destination IP
responds with a SYN|ACK, dryad marks that IP address as a service provider for
the requested port. Dryad ignores RST messages; omission of a port in its “map”
simply means it has not seen evidence of the existence of that port in use.
Figure 3.1 is pseudo code which describes the operation of the lanmap program.
The pseudo code used here is really simplified source code, to ease understanding of
the flow of the program.
The pseudo code accurately describes the way the program lanmap works.
Since lanmap is a program designed to discover everything it can about a network,
clients findings are important as well. Therefore, SYN messages, are use to mark
the source as a client on the attempted port connection.
The Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) and Reverse Address Resolution Pro-
tocol (RARP) map unique IP addresses to unique hardware addresses [40]. The
hardware address range determines the network card manufacturer. This leads to
exploitation of known vulnerabilities in the network card’s drivers for a given oper-
ating system. For systems such as Dell or Compaq servers, their embedded network
hardware addresses uniquely identify the manufacturer of the server so even the
brand of machine can be discovered.
The information that ARP/RARP messages provide is redundant: PCAP al-
ready provides full Ethernet headers to the calling program. Mapping a destination
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lanmap()





packet ← next pcap packet
if (packet.protocol = IP ) // IP packet?
// add source Ethernet/IP mapping
AddToQueue(type = ether, eth addr = src.ether, ip addr = src.ip)
// add destination Ethernet/IP mapping
AddToQueue(type = ether, eth addr = dst.ether, ip addr = dst.ip)
if (packet.IP.protocol = TCP ) // TCP packet?
if (TCP.flag = SY N and TCP.flag 6= ACK) // initial request from client?
AddToQueue(type = client, address = src.IP, port = dst.port)
else if (TCP.flag = SY N and TCP.flag = ACK) // response from server?
AddToQueue(type = server, address = src.IP, port = src.port)
end if // TCP
else if (packet.IP.protocol = UDP ) // UDP packet?
// add both source and destination IPs as UDP server and client
AddToQueue(type = uclient, address = src.IP, port = src.port)
AddToQueue(type = userver, address = src.IP, port = src.port)
end if // UDP
end if
if (emission timer.expired or emission queue.nearlyFull)





/* shouldnt get past here, unless interrupted */
if (interrupted)
/* by user break (Ctrl-C) or other terminating signal from operating system */
if (emission queue.notEmpty)
/* dying, try to get the last bit of information out */
emit packet
end if // queue not empty
end if // interrupted
display statistics
end lanmap
Figure 3.1: lanmap algorithm
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IP address to a destination Ethernet address (and the same for the source addresses)
only requires one IP packet. Thus, ARP/RARP packets can be ignored.
TCP constitutes the substance of this investigation. Using the methods de-
scribed above and in the pseudo-code in Figure 3.1, a vast amount of information
can be learned about client and server machines and their IP addresses.
UDP is similar to TCP, but no handshaking is into the protocol. There is no
way to conclusively determine which end of the connection is a client and which is
the server. Therefore, both of the source and destination addresses are marked as
a client and server on the appropriate ports. This ensures no mappings are missed,
is simple, and results in fewer state variables to track (the last time a given address
and port combination were seen).
A particular challenge of lanmap is creating efficient internal data structures
to maintain knowledge of previous mappings. Instead of using an external database,
lanmap uses an internal hash table to store mapped items. The hashing function is
a simple exclusive-or hash over the mapped item data fields. Finding some simple
code online saves time here [1].
collector, the central repository of mapping data, needs a similar database, but
requires sorting for display purposes. Therefore, an ordered, doubly linked list is
used which collects the mappings transmitted by lanmap [49]. See Figure 3.2 for
collector ’s pseudo-code.
3.5 Design Of The Test Environment
During the final stages of programming the lanmap and collector programs,
more realistic testing of the program’s correctness in identifying traffic as it traversed
the network is needed. It is time to select and start utilizing a suitable network traffic
generator. A traffic generator should emulate multiple network clients connecting to
multiple network servers on multiple ports and predetermined or randomized times
in a repeatable manner.
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collector()













/* normally don’t get here, unless interrupted */
if (interrupted)
/* by user “break” (Ctrl-C) or other terminating signal from operating system */
dump report to screen/log
end if
end collector
Figure 3.2: collector algorithm
3.5.1 Traffic Generators. Several candidate traffic generators with promis-
ing features are readily available.
tg is one of the earlier traffic generators for the Unix operating system world.
tg tests end-to-end capacity and throughput. It consists of a pair of programs, one
the sink side and the other the source side. Once the sink is running and the source
launches, the source sends as much data as fast as it can while keeping track of how
much is sent. The sink also keeps track of what it receives. A third script/program
combines the source and sink log files and describes the performance and capacity
of the channel.
While a good tool for empirically testing end-to-end capacity, error rate, and
bandwidth, it does not meet the needs of the passive mapper. The passive mapper
needs to see diverse traffic from multiple sources to multiple sinks. tg only provides
for connectivity on one port at a time. Worse, neither the source nor sink can be
bound to a specific IP address on the local system.
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NetSpec provides an array of scripting functions that can perform simultane-
ously or in synchronous lock step and (also has a single point to control the number
of systems involved in the test. NetSpec is used to provide network traffic while
testing lanmap and collector during final stages of completion. However due to the
manner in which TCP connections expire (i.e., entering the TIME WAIT state and
the server port remaining in-use, but unusable at the same time) [43]. NetSpec will
not start a second test using the same server-side port number because that port is
still marked as “in-use.” [11]
NISTNet generates traffic and can inject delay and jitter into network streams.
NISTNet is installed by by patching into the Linux kernel. Since NISTNet desta-
bilizes the test bed computer systems and constantly caused kernel panic dumps, it
does not provide for any salient evaluations [12].
tcpreplay injects TCP trace traffic (sniffer data files) onto the network from
a tcpdump file. tcpreplay was developed “in the hopes that a more precise testing
methodology might be applied to the area of network intrusion detection.” It is able
to change the IP addresses and Ethernet addresses of source and destination nodes
so that passive devices like sniffers and intrusion detection systems as well as routers
and firewalls can react as if the traffic were coming from real hosts within the network.
This method is not appropriate–the complex interplay of client-to-server connections
is captured with single-sided script and reduced to network traces. Moreover, as
further explored below, this method does not provide an appropriate environment
for the active mapping system [52].
Chariot was originally coded and provided by NetIQ but development has been
taken over by Ixia. Chariot is also a network testing application and is quite robust.
Like NetSpec, Chariot runs on multiple machines and provides a single console to
control the experiment. It also has a flexible GUI for control as well as after-action
data gathering and analysis. It will automatically send a RST message to open ports
when testing is complete. This means the same system can restart using the same
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server port without delay. Additionally, Chariot has many scripts for simulating
various network conversations (e.g., client and server-side ftp session or client and
server side Windows login session) to further extend its possibilities [6].
LARIAT (Lincoln Adaptable Real-time Information Assurance Test bed) was
funded by the Air Force and DARPA, built by Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy’s (MIT) Lincoln Labs and is capable of generating LAN-like traffic based on
observed user behaviors. The system uses a complex database and multiple Win-
dows and Unix/Linux machines to generate traffic, simulate servers, DNS domains
and sampled Internet web pages.
NISTNet is essentially a pass-through or traffic generating product; it is not
meant to provide services. tcpreplay transmits packets around the network for IDS-
like systems to react to and provides no port-based services. The other three traffic
generators are still configured pair-wise; even Chariot, with its superior GUI and
capability to create banks of test systems, ultimately configures the experiment as
a group of client-server pairs. When the phase of an experiment has two systems
talking to one another on a specific server port, that port is open and available (and
detectable by an active scanner such as nmap). However, when that part of the
experiment is completed, the port is not detectable because it is not open constantly
as a true server port would be. A method is needed which works properly with both
active and passive methods.
The best method is one that generates traffic on various network ports using
appropriate protocols. At the same time, it needs to look like a full network con-
figuration with servers providing properly operating open ports, providing services.
The best candidate, LARIAT, provides both of the requirements but it requires too
many resources [14]. Therefore, this investigation uses honeyd.
3.5.2 honeyd. honeyd is a program that creates virtual honeypots. A
honeypot is an information resource that looks like a true server, but has no real
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production value except for being attacked or exploited by hackers. It is a lure, not
a true service-provider. Therefore, any network connections to or from the system
is likely a probe, an attack or a compromise [8, 50]. honeyd can emulate not just
one system, but a complex network of them. Each virtual system in the honeypot
network (honeynet) has a profile so that it reacts as a real server would. For example,
given the profile of a Windows 2000 server, the virtual honeypot would react, at the
TCP/IP stack level, just like a Windows 2000 server would. Thus, active and passive
operating system fingerprinting systems like nmap or Xprobe identify the virtual
honeypot system as a Windows 2000 server. honeyd also has a scripting function
which allows specialization or expansion of various aspects of the operation of the
virtual machine. Network packets are passed to the script, which acts on them and
generates output. Output is sent back into honeyd as a reply to the originator of
the connection. So, a complex system of virtual systems can be configured and act
and react like suite of servers. The honeyd configuration is developed, tested and
deployed (see Appendix D).
3.5.3 syntraf. Setting up a suite of clients to inject traffic into the network
and interact with the newly constructed suite of servers is more complex than it
seems. However, when a standard client program, such as sendmail, accesses the
network, it usually uses the default IP address for the network adapter; the program
could choose an arbitrary IP address to use during the communication with the
server, but unless that functionality is built into the program, a rewrite of the utility
is required. Without this support, all output connecting to the servers appears to
come from one IP address, not a suite of clients, which, while not wrong, still does
not generate the number of clients connecting to many servers model of a network.
Since no viable tool was discovered in the traffic generator search, some sort of
custom program is needed. The tool syntraf was created to serve as the client-side
traffic generator.
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Figure 3.3 shows a high-level block design of syntraf. Development of several
small Java classes, each built upon a simple TCP client-server model program [32,51]
creates a suite of client-side modules capable of exchanging messages with servers
using similar protocols. For example, consider a client module that does nothing
more than perform simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP, e-mail) sessions. It is
capable of creating an e-mail message and connecting to an SMTP server to fully
transmit it.
A client sequence class schedules the various client modules. Each client se-
quence simulates a given client machine and executes its client modules in some
given, repeatable order. This generator randomly selects which client modules ex-
ecutes next. No weight or proportionality is given to any single module; each is as
likely as the next to get chosen. While this technique does not address the self-similar
nature of network traffic and is simplistic in nature, it is able to provide appropriate
traffic for the passive mapper–the primary thrust of this investigation.
Finally, syntraf has a simulation controller class which reads and parses a
user-specified configuration file and creates all of the client sequencers and then
launches them as threaded processes. The only remaining part is a configuration file
describing the client environment. Using personal knowledge and a mix of client-side
users, a client-side configuration file is generated which gives an interesting mix of
client-side modules. Appendix C, Section C.1.4 for Traffic Generator Source Code
and Section C.2.2, Traffic Generator Configuration Files can be consulted for more
information.
3.5.4 Verification of Code Operation.
3.5.4.1 lanmap and collector. To ensure that lanmap and collector
are responding as designed, they were incrementally tested with actual e-mail and
web traffic while using the UNIX-based e-mail program pine and the Netscape-like
web browser Mozilla Firebird to connect to real servers. At each phase of imple-
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Figure 3.3: syntraf System Block Diagram
mentation, both of these tools are used to ensure continuing operation of lanmap
and collector. When a single connection is made between client and server, four
mappings are expected:
• Client IP to Client Ethernet Address
• Client IP to Client-side Service
• Server IP to Server Ethernet Address
• Server IP to Server-side Service
When repeating the connection, no additional mappings are created. As long as
this holds for each client-server-service connection, the program is acting properly.
If the server IP address is on a different network (which requires a hop across a
gateway), then the server IP is mapped to the gateway’s Ethernet address. If the
client attempts connection to a target IP address which does not exist, either zero or
two mappings are generated. If the IP address is within the network address range
assigned to the client (calculated through the given IP address and network mask
and/or given network address), the client host will perform an ARP lookup to find
the local Ethernet address assigned to the requested IP address. If this ARP fails,
then no IP traffic is generated and, therefore, no mappings are generated. However,
if the target address is outside of the network scope, the TCP/IP connection will
attempt to connect through the default gateway configured on the client. In this
case, the following three mappings are generated:
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• Client IP to Client Ethernet Address
• Client IP to Client-side Service
• Server IP to Gateway Ethernet Address
Since the client is attempting to connect, it is assumed that the client is a
consumer of the given service, even if it cannot successfully connect. Finally, when
a client attempts connection to an existing IP address where the service is not being
provided, three mappings are generated:
• Client IP to Client Ethernet Address
• Client IP to Client-side Service
• Server IP to Server Ethernet Address
The server-side connection will not succeed. It will generate a RST message
on a normally configured system. On a firewalled system, it should not reply. In
either case, the server IP-to-Ethernet address mapping would not be generated.
3.5.4.2 syntraf. During the development of syntraf, each client mod-
ule (e-mail, ftp, web, etc.) is tested against live servers to ensure proper operation.
Each client’s protocol document (Internet Request for Comments) is also consulted
to take into effect any deviations unknown to the researcher as well as specific error
codes and messages emitted by a server of the given protocol. Finally, syntraf, lan-
map, and collector are tested together. tcpdump traces are collected to ensure that
lanmap sees what syntraf generates and collector sees what lanmap outputs. The
traffic generated by each program is meticulously checked to ensure full system flow
of information. During the experimentation phase, several traces are hand analyzed
to ensure the flow matches.
3.5.4.3 honeyd. The honeyd configuration was debugged using con-
trolled client connections (again, using the telnet, mail, and web programs described
above) to ensure proper operation [19]. Then, the syntraf and nmap programs were
incorporated into the testing to ensure proper operation.
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3.6 Design Of Experiments
3.6.1 Approach. The methodology used herein is based on the empirical
study of actual systems in a controlled environment. Each mapping system is runs
on a real network to perform its mapping function. Built-in software measurements
and third-party sniffer logs provide the metric collection functions. The results of
the mapping session are tallied and compared to the known network configuration
and then compared to the other method using statistical methods.
3.6.2 System Boundaries. Each mapping system consists of the mapping
probe/sensor itself, and a collector which may coexist on the same system. Figure 3.4
is a block diagram of the overall system.
Figure 3.4: Mapping System Block Diagram
3.6.3 System Services. Both the active and passive mapping systems gener-
ate a list of IP addresses and the client and/or server ports observed to be functional
at that IP address.
3.6.4 Performance Metrics. With respect to the mapping techniques, four
separate metrics are collected. Table 3.1 shows the metrics chosen in determining
the performance of a network mapping system.
Relevant metrics are those which measure the accuracy and efficiency of the
mapper’s decision algorithm. The number of server or client address-to-service
matches measures the accuracy of the system. This metric is simple to collect in the
experimental environment: simply count the number of correct address-to-service
matches as appropriate for the client or server. These metrics are gathered from
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Table 3.1: Performance Metrics
Performance Metric Measure of
Server address-to-service matches (Server Discoveries) Accuracy
Client address-to-service matches (Client Discoveries) Accuracy
Count of packets received (Packets In) Efficiency
Count of packets transmitted (Packets Out) Efficiency
logs and reports generated by the mapping system using custom Perl scripts (see
Appendix C, Sections C.1.1 and C.1.2 for uncollect.pl and ungrep.pl, respectively) to
normalize their respective results. These normalized logs are compared against the
traffic generator configuration (for the Client Discoveries) and against the honeyd
configuration (for the Server Discoveries) using a custom Java matching program,
matchem (see Figure 3.5 for pseudo-code or Appendix C, Section C.1.3 for full source
code).
Since the experimental network is known, comparing the results from the map-
ping system to the actual network is simple. False positives mappings are also
tracked. If the given mapping system decides that a service exists at an address
when it does not, that decision gets added to the false positive count. This metric
is also gathered at the time of the matching procedure.
To measure efficiency, the number of packets received by and generated from
the mapper are counted. tcpdump logs all incoming and outgoing IP and ARP pack-
ets that the mapping system’s host receives or generates [35]. Since there are no
other services running on the mapping system’s host during the experiment, only
mapping traffic is received by the host’s network interface. Additionally, the num-
ber of packets dropped by the operating system kernel is collected. Depending on
processor speed and the network load, it is possible for the passive network map-
per and/or the tcpdump sniffer to drop packets. While this is a performance issue,
dropped packets can change the outcome of an experiment. “Discovery” metrics are
both “higher-is-better” metrics–the more discovered about the network, the better.








add to known item database
update totalItemCount
read traffic generator configuration
add to known database
update totalItemCount
open discovery log file
while (not EOF(discovery log)) loop
entry ← nextrecord
if (database.contains(entry))
if (entry.type = server)
serverHitCount ← serverHitCount + 1
else if (entry.type = client)
clientHitCount ← clientHitCount + 1
end if
else
falsePositiveCount ← falsePositiveCount + 1
dump entry to screen/log
end if
end loop






Figure 3.5: matchem algorithm
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ets on the network needed to make those decisions the worse the method is. Total
Discoveries is the sum of the Client Discoveries and Server Discoveries metrics for
a given trial. It is also “higher-is-better” metric. These metrics are used to further
derive the metrics in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Derived Performance Metrics
Derived Performance Metric Measure of
Total Discoveries (Combined client and server matches) Accuracy
False Positives Accuracy
Overhead Packets In (Count of Inbound Overhead Packets) Efficiency
Total Network Overhead (Overhead Packets In + Packets Out) Efficiency
The only metric that bears further definition is the “count of overhead packets
in.” Both mapping methods (given the passive mapper works in a mapper / collector
pair) generate packets. Thus, packets emitted by either system are considered over-
head. Input packets, however, are a different matter. The active mapper generates
extra traffic, anticipating the target will respond which would generate further over-
head traffic, seen as input to the active mapper. The passive mapper only uses the
traffic on the network and, therefore, does not observe this phenomena. The passive
mapper has no overhead with respect to input. The number of overhead packets in,





0 : ifMethod = ”Passive”
Packets In : ifMethod = ”Active”
The “Total Network Overhead” is simply the sum of the two Overhead factors.
The Overhead metrics are “lower-is-better” metrics.
3.6.5 System Parameters. System parameters are those configuration items
or settings which cause the system to change and affect the way it acts or reacts
to a given workload. There are several system parameters that effect the mapping
systems. First, of course, is the method by which the network is mapped. Both active
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and passive methods have unique characteristics in their operation and generation
of results. Second, placement of the sensor within the network is an important
parameter. The active mapper needs unfettered access to the hosts it is mapping.
This means that it cannot be on the other side of a firewall or equivalent network
device. The probes must be allowed through and the responses must be allowed
to return to the mapper in order to generate an effective map. A passive mapper
needs even more access to the network traffic. Is the mapper on a network hub
in the same Ethernet collision domain as the servers? Is it on a hub with clients?
Or is it on an Ethernet switch only receiving packets destined for its hardware
address? With the passive mapper, the more traffic and greater diversity of traffic
it can collect gives it more data to map. The amount of time a mapping system
uses to discover the network also changes its performance. With either system,
the more time available, the more information gathered and the more accurate the
picture formed. The speed and capacity of the sensor platform may also contribute
differences in success or failure. In both cases, the sensor platforms need sufficient
memory and processor speed sufficient to the task. Otherwise, they are overwhelmed
with input and network packets could be dropped, losing the information that they
were to provide. Maximum available bandwidth goes hand-in-hand with the CPU
and memory capacity. If the mapper is running with a 10 megabit network interface
on a moderately utilized 100 megabit network segment, it is likely that the sensor
will drop or even miss packets. Finally, latency due to long-haul circuits and multiple
hop paths through a network can change the speed at which each mapper receives
packets. These parameters are summarized in Table 3.3.
3.6.6 Workload Parameters. The workload the systems are offered affects
the performance and outcome of the systems, which result in several parameters.
The amount of existing network traffic can affect the speed of the active mapper by
increasing delay due to congestion and possibly dropped packets. The greater the
amount of this background traffic, the more network services the passive mapper
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Table 3.3: System Parameters
Parameter Potential Levels
Mapping method used active or passive
Amount of time given to perform mapping 0 sec - 1 week
Number of mapping sensors in the network 1 to any number
Location of sensors within the network same as clients, same as servers
Type of network connection switch or hub
Location of the collector inside or outside (the probed net)
Available system memory 32MB to any size
Processor type and speed Pentium 3 500MHz or faster
Network interface type and speed 10MB, 100MB or 1000MB
Network latency 0.0 msec to any latency
can discover. Again, if the passive mapper is overloaded, packets are dropped and
accuracy is potentially lost. The pattern of the existing network traffic can vary
widely minute-to-minute. Since most traffic is generated by user action (i.e., logins,
reading and writing e-mail, fetching web pages, etc.), it is essentially random. The
number of clients and the number of servers will also affect the workload. A workload
with a large number of clients connecting to a large number of servers will be much
different than one with a small number of clients connecting to a large number of
servers or vice versa. These workload parameters are summarized at Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Workload Parameters
Parameter Potential Levels
Number of service providers in the network 1 to any number
Number of services provided by the network 1 to any number
Number of clients in the network 1 to any number
Number of packets traversing the network 1 - 99% utilization
Packet arrival rate 0 up to bandwidth limits
Type of environment normal or firewalled
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3.7 Factors
The following system and workload factors are chosen to provide for a smaller
set of experiments. These factors are also chosen as it appears they have the most
affect on the outcome of a mapping session.
3.7.1 System Factors. To narrow the scope of this research, this investi-
gation limits the factors to the method used for mapping, either active or passive.
Since the method used is the premise of this investigation, this factor is a necessity.
The second factor is the Time Given for the mapping function to run. There are five
levels to the Time Given factor–times chosen during pilot runs of each technique due
to interesting things happening at those times. These two factors are summarized
at Table 3.5. Since the testing environment is not capable of putting a sniffer device
on the “server” side since it only exists virtually, other factors were not considered.
Furthermore, the PCAP library is incapable examining the internal structure of hon-
eyd. Using more than one sensor on this test network is not needed; one sensor can
see all of the traffic from all the clients in the simulation. A Cisco 2950 switch is
used for all tests. Since Ethernet switches are becoming more prolific, finding a hub
in a production network is becoming increasingly difficult. Hardware factors such
as the CPU, available memory, and the speed of the network adapter are all fixed.
Network latency is minimal; the only network device is the switch.
Table 3.5: System Factors
System Factor Levels
Method active or passive
Time Given (minutes) 0.5, 1.0, 5.0, 10.0, or 40.0
The bandwidth and available CPU speed and memory are fixed for both the
active and passive mapping systems. The mapping system is one Dell Dimension
4100 running a 500 MHz Pentium III with 512MB of RAM. The network interface
is a 3Com 3C905 10/100Mb Ethernet adapter running at 100Mb, full-duplex. The
location of the sensor is on the same network switch as the clients.
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3.7.2 Workload Factors. To limit the number of experiments and to focus
on the goal of this investigation, the workload factors are limited and adjusted. First,
the workload is adjusted by using three randomized traffic generation patterns, the
third of which revealed interesting properties during pilot testing. Second, the server
environment in which the mapper works is adjusted to two scenarios: firewalled and
normal. In the firewalled scenario, each service-providing system is configured such
that a connection to any port not configured with a service is dropped, instead of
the RST message back to the originator. The normal scenario is just the opposite,
and more like a normal system inside a firewalled boundary. These factors are
summarized at Table 3.6. The levels in the Traffic Pattern factor are numeric seeds
to the random number generator in the syntraf traffic generator program.
Table 3.6: Workload Factors
Workload Factor Levels
Traffic Pattern (seed) 1, 2 or 4
Scenario Firewall or Normal
The other parameters remain fixed. Both of the honeyd scenario configurations
provide for 136 unique address-to-service mappings and the traffic generator configu-
ration provides for another 321 unique client-side address-to-service mappings. This
amounts to 457 unique items for the mapper systems to find. The packet or message
arrival rate is dependent upon the traffic generator and the response of the honeyd
network system, and is not considered as a factor.
3.8 Evaluation Technique
This investigation measures real systems in a controlled network environment.
Since the network topology and configured services are known a priori, it is a simple
matter of comparing found items to the known items.
3.8.1 Systems Environment. The test system environment hardware is il-
lustrated in Figure 3.6 and Table 3.7 shows the specific system information summary.
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Table 3.7: Hardware Environment Specifications
System CPU (MHz) RAM (MB) Firmware Network Card
Switch Cisco 2950-24 20 12.1(13)EA1 n/a
Sniffer/Collector PIII/933 (C) 256 A11 3C905
Mapper PIII/500 (K) 512 A11 3C905
Honeynet PIII/1000 (C) 512 A11 3C905
Generator PIII/800 (C) 256 A11 3C905
Each system is running Debian GNU/Linux “unstable” distribution, with Linux
Kernel version 2.4.22. The unstable distribution provides the latest updates and pro-
gram fixes as well as some leading-edge code, but has not yet been officially released.
Debian has not released a full stable distribution since late 2000 [5]. Linux is se-
lected as the operating system since its source code is freely available. Many of the
hacker tools developed over the past few years have been targeted at Linux. nmap
and siphon were both Linux targets before spreading to other operating systems.
Finally, Linux runs well on the limited hardware resources available to this research.
Debian has a very robust package dependency checking using the APT utility; two
simple commands update the installed software and include any dependencies if ad-
ditional software is installed.
Each system has two network interfaces, one connected to a control network,
the other connected to the test network. The control network is used to remotely
login to each machine and execute the commands to perform each experiment. The
control network interface uses 10Mbit network cards. The test network is 100Mbit
and is the network which is used during the experiments. The two networks are kept
logically separate by using separate virtual lans (VLANs) within the Cisco 2950
switch. See Figure 3.6 for an overview.
3.8.2 Software Environment. Each of the systems have specific roles and
therefore have specific software installed in the test bed. The software items are
detailed in Table 3.8.
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Figure 3.6: Hardware Environment




lanmap / collector Mapper and Sniffer / collector
nmap (timer modification) v3.48 Mapper
syntraf Generator
KDevelop v2.1 (KDE) Generator
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Since time is a factor in the experiments, the mapping systems must be in-
strumented with a timing device to halt execution of the mapping systems. It was
easier, however, to set a timer in the traffic generator than it was in the C pro-
gram lanmap. When terminating lanmap, it dumps collected information to a log.
Since it does not rely on the traffic generator for input, nmap needs to be stopped.
However, when terminating an nmap session, nmap merely releases memory in use,
closes any open files and terminates in an orderly fashion. Any collected information
is lost. By adding a command-line option, moving selected procedural variables into
the global scope and adding a timer signal handler, a timer-capable nmap is born.
A session-timeout value, measured in seconds, can be specified. When the timer
expires, nmap stops probing, ignores any incoming packets, and displays or logs the
network information it collected thus far.
3.8.3 Test System Interaction. The systems interact as depicted in Fig-
ure 3.7 for an active experiment and Figure 3.8 for a passive one. honeyd is initialized
and prepared for receipt of traffic. When performing an active mapping experiment,
the sniffer system is “tapped” into all network traffic by using a SPAN port on the
2950 switch which redirects incoming traffic on the remaining systems’ switch ports
to its switch port. The sniffer system runs a tcpdump session to capture all IP and
ARP traffic. The mapping system gets a command-line prepared for the current
experiment (see Figure C.1 in Appendix C for specifics). A syntraf session is started
for the appropriate time period plus 30 seconds allowing sufficient time to start the
mapping system. The experiment ends when the nmap session is complete. A “Ctrl-
C” break stops the syntraf and tcpdump sessions and the tcpdump logs are gathered.
Logs from the honeyd side are saved into their own directory.
When performing a passive experiment, there are differences in the system op-
eration. honeyd is initialized first. Instead of the sniffer machine pm a SPAN port,
however, the mapper system, lanmap is connected to the SPAN port. Therefore,
the tcpdump session to keep track of packet counts must be executed on the map-
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Figure 3.7: Active Test System Configuration
per. Since the Cisco 2950 switch is limited to one SPAN session, both lanmap and
tcpdump need to run on the same system. The collector machine starts a collec-
tor session. lanmap starts on the mapper and redirects its network output to the
collector machine. Another limitation of the Cisco 2950 switch is when using the
SPAN port, no traffic may be input into the switch through that port. Therefore,
the mapper requires two network interfaces to function. In this case, the mapper
uses the control network to emit its packets to the collector. The lanmap program
keeps track of the number of packets and their sizes sent to the collector as the
tcpdump process cannot watch more than one network interface at a time. Finally,
a syntraf session is begun on the traffic generator system. The experiment ends
when syntraf ceases transmitting (at its timeout value). lanmap is stopped, then
collector. tcpdump is stopped and finally honeyd. As before, logs from all processes
are collected and saved.
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Figure 3.8: Passive Test System Configuration
3.9 Experimental Execution
A full factorial design with three repetitions results in a total of 2 (method)
x 5 (time slots) x 2 (scenarios) x 3 (traffic patterns) x 3 (replications) = 180 trials
for the all experiments. To perform a given experiment the script in Figure C.1 is
followed.
3.10 Summary
This chapter has discussed the requirements of a notional passive network
mapper, examined possible candidates to use as a passive mapper and the design
of a custom passive mapper. Further, this chapter discussed the requirements of a
network mapping test bed, taking both methods, active and passive, into account
and construction of such a test bed. Next, it discussed the design of experiments,
including system and workload parameters and the factors chosen for this research.
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Finally, this chapter discussed the evaluation technique and overall interaction of all




This chapter describes the execution of the experiments and the analysis of the
data. Section 4.2 describes the method of data collection and the software packages
used for generating statistical results, and the initial Analysis of Variance (ANOVA).
Section 4.3 describes the comparison of the accuracy metrics. Section 4.4 discusses
comparison of the efficiency metrics. Section 4.5 discusses overall findings. Finally,
Section 4.6 discusses limitations of the experiments and methods chosen.
4.2 Collection of Data and Analysis of Variance
As described in Chapter 3, all the experiments are performed, in an identical
fashion, varying the factors as appropriate to the given trial. Results are collected
using the Perl scripts to normalize the output log files of lanmap and nmap and then
read by the matchem program to determine their accuracy. These results are initially
entered into an Excel R© spreadsheet (see Appendix A). Later, the statistical software
package JMP R© is used to gather the information for better statistical analysis.
A quick examination of the response variables indicate a large range between
the minimum and maximum value of each response variable. According to Jain [36],
because the ratio of ymax/ymin is large (where y is the appropriate response variable),
a logarithmic transformation is useful. Therefore, for the remainder of this analysis,
all of the response variables are log (base 10) transformed; any zero results in the
original data, remains a zero result in the log transformed data.
Also note that during the testing there were no false positives generated by
either mapping method, probably due to the relatively pristine configuration of the
network. This response variable is ignored for the remainder of this examination.
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4.2.1 Eliminating Traffic Pattern Factor. Up to and including the five
minute time category, the Traffic Pattern appeared to have some effect on the out-
come of the tests. However, THE variance chart on “Log Total Discoveries” and the
ANOVA as seen in Figure 4.1, indicate otherwise. The results show that the Traffic
Pattern has virtually no effect on “Log Total Discoveries.” So, in an effort to remove
Traffic Pattern as a factor, confidence interval tests on all of the gathered response
variables were conducted.
Figure 4.1: Overall Analysis of Variance of the Effects for “Total Discoveries”
Generating confidence intervals (CIs) for the Server and Client Discoveries
response variables produces Table 4.1 and Table B.1 in Appendix B, respectively.
As these results show in both client and server cases, all three means are contained
in the other confidence intervals. This means that they are statistically the same
and can be ignored with respect to the accuracy metrics.
The results in Table B.3 and Table B.4, both in Section B.1 of Appendix
B, show the confidence intervals of “Packets In” and “Packets Out” metrics. These
results also show that the mean and standard deviation estimators for all three Traffic
Patterns are statistically equivalent given a 95% confidence interval. Therefore, the
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Table 4.1: 95% CI on Server Discoveries by Log Traffic Pattern
Estimator Pattern Estimate Lower CI Upper CI
Mean 1 1.264 1.100 1.429
2 1.271 1.106 1.435
4 1.257 1.094 1.421
Std Dev 1 0.636 0.539 0.779
2 0.636 0.539 0.775
4 0.634 0.537 0.773
Traffic Pattern factor can be ignored as it does not result in any significant variation
in the response variables.
This is not a surprising outcome, however. When run over a short amount of
time, it is quite possible for the traffic generator not to use given services and/or client
combinations and produce varied results. But when the random number generators
are given long enough (apparently between five and ten minutes worth of events),
the traffic generator will have used all possible combinations within its configuration,
obviating any differences due to the Traffic Pattern.
4.2.2 Examining Factor Effects on Metrics. With the Traffic Pattern factor
eliminated, the effects of each of the factors in each of the response variables are
tested. In Table 4.2, the bold highlighted probabilities shows those factors which are
statistically significant to the outcome of the “Client Discoveries” metric.
Table 4.2: Effects Test for Log Client Discoveries (α = 0.05)
Source Nparm DF SS F Ratio Prob > F
Method 1 1 252.170 760001.357 4.53E-296
Time Given*Method 4 4 1.146 863.325 3.86E-107
Time Given 4 4 1.146 863.325 3.86E-107
Scenario*Method 1 1 0.006 18.945 2.39E-005
Scenario 1 1 0.006 18.946 2.39E-005
Time Given*Scenario 4 4 0.003 2.517 4.35E-002
Time Given*Scenario*Method 4 4 0.003 2.517 4.35E-002
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The statistics show that all of the first level, second-level and the one third-level
effects are statistically significant to the outcome of the Client Discoveries response
variable. However, the statistics also show that the first level Method factor has the
strongest affect on the outcome, with the first level Time Given and the second level
Time Given*Method factor having an equal secondary effect.
Interestingly, when testing the Server Discoveries response variable as in Ta-
ble 4.3, the Time Given factor provides slightly more effect than the Time Given*Method
second-level factor. The first-level Method factor has the third-highest effect. While
the Method factor does not dominate here, it is a contributing factor. Obviously,
the number of Server Discoveries is sensitive to time.
Table 4.3: Effects Test for Log Server Discoveries (α = 0.05)
Source Nparm DF SS F Ratio Prob > F
Time Given 4 4 32.334 23486.751 2.23E-220
Time Given*Method 4 4 28.895 20988.414 1.77E-216
Method 1 1 3.829 11124.780 8.56E-150
Scenario 1 1 2.188 6357.945 1.01E-130
Scenario*Method 1 1 1.860 5405.586 3.12E-125
Time Given*Scenario 4 4 1.106 803.682 9.08E-105
Time Given*Scenario*Method 4 4 1.157 840.224 3.06E-010
When considering the “Packets In” response variable, different mix of effects
were significant as shown in Table 4.4. While the outcome is still dominated by the
Method factor, the second-highest effect is the first-level Scenario factor. This is
due to the solely to nature of the nmap active mapper. The Scenario factor varies
the type of server environment between a firewalled suite to a standard suite. When
nmap probes a firewalled host and receives no response in a given time frame, it
repeats that probe up to three more times. If no answer is received, that server/port
combination is marked as “filtered” because it cannot mark it open (no SYN|ACK
response) and cannot mark it as closed (no RST|ACK response). So, during the
firewall scenario, the mapper does not receive packets back in response to a non-
existent service. On the other hand, when mapping during the normal scenario, all
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the non-existent probes return the RST|ACK. So dependent upon how many ports
are scanned, nmap gets as much as it gives.
Table 4.4: Effects Test for Log Packets In (α = 0.05)
Source Nparm DF SS F Ratio Prob > F
Method 1 1 145.536 1438839.450 0
Scenario 1 1 65.585 648407.756 1.49E-290
Scenario*Method 1 1 60.915 602238.296 5.47E-288
Time Given 4 4 48.103 118892.467 1.12E-276
Time Given*Method 4 4 4.617 11410.679 2.32E-195
Time Given*Scenario 4 4 1.382 3415.676 9.68E-154
Time Given*Scenario*Method 4 4 1.404 3469.597 2.80E-154
The test for Packets Out is similar to the Client Discoveries effects and can be
found in Table B.8 in Section B.2 of Appendix B. It is not duplicated here.
As can be seen in three of the four response variables, the Method factor is
the primary effect. Clearly, the Method factor, either active or passive, has a great
deal of effect in the outcome of these three variables, and is in two of the top three
effects of the final response variable. Looking at the derivative metrics may provide
more information about these effects.
4.2.3 Examining the Derivative Metrics. Continuing the exploration of the
effects of the response variables, the “Total Discoveries” metric, Table 4.5 shows the
effects of the two accuracy outcomes (Client Discoveries and Server Discoveries) in
aggregate. Again, the Method factor is the strongest, followed by the Time Given
and second-level Time Given*Method effects. This is not too surprising due to the
fact that the number of Client Discoveries is driven primarily by the Method factor
and has a larger outcome. On average, there are approximately 124 clients discovered
relative to the 38 servers discovered. Since the Total Discoveries metric is a simple
sum of the Server and Client metrics, it stands to reason that the Client Discoveries
and its effects, would drive the Total Discoveries metric to a great extent.
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Table 4.5: Effects Test for Log Total Discoveries (α = 0.05)
Source Nparm DF SS F Ratio Prob > F
Method 1 1 75.623 185190.932 4.89E-247
Time Given 4 4 41.490 25401.171 4.26E-223
Time Given*Method 4 4 21.561 13199.974 2.09E-200
Scenario 1 1 2.246 5499.876 8.14E-126
Scenario*Method 1 1 1.808 4427.709 1.62E-118
Time Given*Scenario 4 4 1.141 698.388 3.86E-100
Time Given*Scenario*Method 4 4 1.123 687.270 1.30E-099
Examining the effects with respect to the Overhead Packets In metric, again
the Method factor has the greatest amount of effect on the outcome. See Table B.10
for details. Remember as discussed in Chapter 3, due to the nature of the mappers,
any packet outbound of the mapper system would be over-and-above the normal
traffic transiting the network. Therefore, the Packets Out metric is functionally
equivalent to an Overhead Packets Out metric and is not discussed further.
Finally, in Table B.11, the Method factor once again dominates the outcome
of this response variable. Not surprising since the two values feeding this aggregate
metric were dominated by the Metric factor.
Seeing as how three out of four primary response variables are dominated by
the Method factor and all of the derived response variables are dominated by the
Method factor, it appears that the Method factor is the primary factor driving the
response of the system.
4.3 Comparison of Accuracy Metrics
4.3.1 Overall Accuracy. Next, we evaluate the 95% confidence intervals of
the accuracy response variables (Server, Client and Total Discoveries) and from the
two Method levels of active and passive. Then compare the CI’s to see if the CI’s
capture the other response variable’s mean or standard deviation estimator. Since
the overall data is skewed due to the time factor, this comparison focuses on the
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40-minute Time Given factor, where the discovery results are maximized for both
methods.
Table 4.6 shows this comparison for Server Discoveries. Since neither the con-
fidence interval of the means nor the standard deviation captures the estimators,
they are statistically different, and, in this case the active mapper discovered more
information about the network than the passive mapper did.
Table 4.6: 95% CI on Log Server Discoveries by Method (Time=40)
Estimator Method Estimate Lower CI Upper CI
Mean Active 2.101 2.097 2.104
Passive 1.431 1.431 1.431
Std Dev Active 0.007 0.006 0.011
Passive 0 0 0
Due to the method the passive mapper uses, it would not see any traffic for a
service that goes unused. In this case, most servers were not fully exercised by the
clients. If the clients had been configured (rather artificially) to connect to every
server on every port, the passive mapper would have seen it and these results would
be more similar. As it stands, however, the active mapper is the one which exercises
more ports–1656 in this case–on all of the systems it can discover. If the passive
mapper were listening during the active mapper’s scan, its server discoveries metric
would be much higher.
With respect to the Client Discoveries, however, the active mapper found noth-
ing. Table 4.7 shows that the passive mapper is superior. As clients do not provide
services but rather consume them, the active mapper cannot discover them. Indeed,
active mapper systems are designed to find open service-providers, not the clients
who use them.
These two comparisons don’t provide a clear-cut winner, so it becomes neces-
sary to compare the Total Discoveries to determine best overall performance with
respect to accuracy. Generating this confidence interval as shown in Table 4.8 dis-
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Table 4.7: 95% CI on Log Client Discoveries by Method (Time=40)
Estimator Method Estimate Lower CI Upper CI
Mean Active 0 0 0
Passive 2.507 2.507 2.507
Std Dev Active 0 0 0
Passive 0 0 0
closes that the passive mapper is the better of the two with regard to overall number
of discoveries. Indeed, since there are typically more users (and, therefore, clients)
using a network than servers, the passive mapper discovers more about a given net-
work while watching transactions cross its path.
Table 4.8: 95% CI on Log Total Discoveries by Method (Time=40)
Estimator Method Estimate Lower CI Upper CI
Mean Active 2.101 2.097 2.104
Passive 2.542 2.542 2.542
Std Dev Active 0.007 0.006 0.011
Passive 0 0 0
4.3.2 Accuracy over Time. Part of this examination looks at performance
of the methods over time. Figure 4.2 shows the mean values plotted over time for
the respective mapping method. The overall effect of the graphic is evident: the
passive method is the overall winner.
Interestingly, the active mapper found no clients but it did discover more
servers than the passive mapper, as mentioned above.
4.4 Comparison of Efficiency Metrics
4.4.1 Overall Efficiency. A similar examination of the efficiency metrics,
specifically looking at the “overhead” metrics shows similar results. Remember that
the overhead factors are describing extra traffic on the network and are considered
detrimental to the function of the mapper. In fact, both the Overhead Packets Out
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Figure 4.2: Discoveries over Time (higher is better)
and Total Network Overhead show that the passive mapper is superior. Table 4.9
demonstrates this.
Table 4.9: 95% CI on Total Network Overhead (Log # Packets)
Estimator Method Estimate Lower CI Upper CI
Mean Active 4.523 4.413 4.634
Passive 2.082 2.030 2.134
Std Dev Active 0.527 0.459 0.617
Passive 0.249 0.217 0.291
The active mapper generates many packets and also stimulates other network
devices to generate packets in response. The passive mapper does its job with fewer
overhead packets.
4.4.2 Efficiency over Time. Figure 4.3 shows the mean values plotted over
time for the respective mapping method. Note that the Time Given (the x-axis
scale) is categorical rather than a true time scale, due to the time periods chosen.
However the passive method is clearly more efficient.
4.5 Summary
honeyd and syntraf were configured with 136 total server-side services and 321
client-side service consumers for a total of 457 discoverable services.
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Figure 4.3: Network Overhead over Time (lower is better)
lanmap is more accurate than nmap. It discovers at its peak, an average of
76.1% of all configured services (server- and client-side) whereas nmap only found
27.6% of those same services. When considering only the server-side services, lan-
map discovered only 19.9% of those services while nmap discovered 92.7% of the
configured server-side services. Clearly, nmap is better at finding unused server-side
services. With respect to client-side service consumers, lanmap discovered 100% of
all those services while nmap found none. Since most networks contain considerably
more clients than servers, finding the client services in-use provides for more network
discoveries.
When considering the efficiency of each system, lanmap generated an average
of 200 packets of network overhead at its peak network utilization. nmap, on the
other hand, generated over 8,600 packets on average at its minimum utilization
and up to 155,000 packets at its maximum average value.
4.6 Limitations
4.6.1 UDP. The server-side UDP echo server implemented in honeyd
would not reliably react to incoming packets and would block, awaiting input even
when input was made available. It was determined that there were differences with
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how honeyd and the supporting scripts for the service differ with respect to data
formats and/or some unknown conversion was occurring. Network traces did not
reveal any obvious problems. Packets were arriving at the honeyd system but the
script was not properly handling the input.
In order to “simulate” those UDP services, the configuration files were changed
to put those services which are normally UDP at the same port with a TCP con-
figuration. A side-effect of this is that the active mapper now had more data. In
its default configuration, nmap does not search for UDP ports–those services would
have been invisible to nmap if left on UDP.
4.6.2 syntraf.
4.6.2.1 Thread Execution Order. Each thread in syntraf has its
own random number generator and is seeded by the main program, which also has
its own random number generator. Thus, each thread gets a different seed and
therefore its own order of traffic generation. However, there is still a certain amount
of randomness due to the uncertainty with respect to the execution order of these
threads. Given enough repetition, however, this problem did not seem to have much
of an effect.
4.6.2.2 Similarity to Real Traffic. syntraf was developed as a stable
platform to generate traffic for the passive mapper to analyze. However, due to
its use of the uniform random number generator built-in to the Java libraries, it
does not address the self-similarity of users in a real system. It could be improved
to provide this functionality, but it was not the object to build something wholly
complex. LARIAT exists for that purpose [46]. The needs of this research does not
warrant the complexity of a full-fledged network simulator.
4.6.2.3 Client-side Active Mapping. nmap can and did discover client
computers. However, due to the vagaries of the network configuration, nmap actually
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mapped the host system’s open ports. Since these were outside the control of the
experiment, these results were discarded.
The result is that the clients that syntraf provides do not have any open
services and do not look “normal.” Instead, they are completely firewalled. They do
not respond in any way to any probes. This was not an oversight; the complexity
of creating a two-sided honeynet-like system, which provided services on one side
and simulated client machines on the other, injecting traffic into both systems was
beyond the scope of this research.
4.6.3 Number of SPAN Sessions. The Cisco Catalyst 2950 switch is only
capable of having one SPAN session–that is, there can only be one port chosen to
host a sniffer. Because of this, the passive mapper had to essentially run two sniffers
on it–lanmap and a tcpdump to capture the traffic seen by lanmap. While there
did not appear to be any problem with the systems used during this investigation
(no packets were dropped due to congestion on any of the experimental trials), it is
obvious that a more loaded network would easily swamp the two sniffers.
4.6.4 nmap.
4.6.4.1 Mapping of the Test-bed Hosts During the Session. nmap’s
discovery capability was complete. In fact, it mapped the host computers hosting
the test-bed. Due to the nature of the configuration, each of the hosts test network
connection had an IP address assigned, in a higher range to keep them “out of
the way.” When nmap was given enough time, however, it found these hosts and
mapped them. These results were discarded and the experiments redone with those
IP address ranges for the host machines excluded from the search.
4.6.4.2 Run Times. Both systems, lanmap and nmap, were given
specific time frames in which they to discover what they could about the network.
lanmap was designed as a run-forever program that reports its results until it is
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terminated. On the other hand, nmap systematically probes target networks for
services. Once the list of networks is exhausted, nmap is done. In an average of
8.24 minutes, nmap would complete its scan of the given network in the “normal”
scenario. The “firewall” scenario quadrupled that completion time to an average of
37.6 minutes. This extra time is caused by nmap’s extra attempts to find a service
at a non-responding port. nmap gives up after four attempts on a given port. Recall
that the normal scenario’s servers would respond with a RST message instead of
simply dropping the packet and nmap would know that the given port is closed.
Another consequence of the full nmap scan finishing in under 10 minutes during
the Active / Normal scenario, the 40 minute trials would be meaningless. So, one
trial using the 40 minute settings is performed once to ensure that it would still
complete within the 10 minute time frame. Since it does, that result and results
from the 10 minute trials are averaged and placed into the data tables instead of
performing eight more nearly identical trials.
4.6.5 Real Systems.
4.6.5.1 Total Knowledge. It is certainly rare to have total knowledge
and control over the systems contained within a network. Indeed, with user sys-
tems turned on and off throughout a day, random network outages severing ties to
various systems (server and client computers alike), and the day-to-day changes of
a network are the primary responsibilities of network management personnel. Hav-
ing full knowledge of this test bed network enabled right-or-wrong answers about
the existence of systems and their services. In a real network, that information is
not available or worse, not accurate. When using these tools against an adversarial
system where little to nothing is known about the configurations, it is unlikely that
either mapping system will know for a fact if it has made a correct answer about a
given service on a given machine. Using the test bed simplified this and made the
comparisons more accurate.
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4.6.5.2 Performance. The test network was built for testing a small
subset of a real network. In a real system, with a real, loaded network, this system
would be swamped.
After the experimental trials were completed, the AFIT network administrators
allowed access to the real network to try lanmap’s capabilities on real traffic. lanmap
worked and was able to discover hosts, however, upon completion of a run, lanmap
said it had dropped roughly one-half of the available packets. This was due to
the operating system’s inability to handle the offered load. The operating system’s
packet filter is responsible for providing PCAP with packets based on PCAP’s filter.
However, due to the rate at which these packets arrive, the operating system drops
arriving packets destined for PCAP to keep from overrunning its internal buffers.
When a PCAP function is called to fetch packets from the operating system, the
operating system tells PCAP how many packets it received, and how many were
dropped. lanmap and other PCAP-based programs can determine how much traffic
is lost between calls to the PCAP routines.
A real system would need to have one or more of:
1. a larger packet buffer in the operating system space,
2. a more robust processor, and
3. statistical methods such as those discussed by Claffy [21, 22] for sampling the
data crossing the network.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter, the performance of lanmap and nmap were compared in the
environment specified in Chapter 3. lanmap turned out to work better than nmap in
almost every category, except for the discovery of server-side services. nmap found
92.7% of the offered services while lanmap only discovered those the 19.9% used by




The focus of this research is to empirically compare passive and active network
mapping techniques. This research does that and expands the knowledge base for
network mapping.
This research also created a new mapping utility which provides a method to
map a network passively. An existing algorithm from ettercap’s dryad module was
simplified and enhanced. Simultaneously, adding a simple UDP transmission allows
the system to get the mapping information out of the network being probed. This
research also provided a central collection system where data can be aggregated.
Finally, this research provides a method for generating traffic in a realistic
environment. Even though a single traffic generator is used during the experiments,
there is nothing to keep multiple generators and multiple honeynets from being used
as a traffic-based test bed.
5.2 Performance of the Mapping Methods
The data presented in Chapter 4 shows that passive mapping discovers more
about the network than the active mapper and does so with less overhead on the
network. However, the active mapper excelled at discovering offered but unused
services. Indeed, it discovers all offered services, no matter the scenario. When
mapping a network, you need as much data as possible to represent the network as
accurately as possible.
The traffic generator patterns had little effect on the output. The mapping
method used typically had the most effect with the time factor providing an addi-
tional variance.
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Both methods perform better when given more time to run. In both cases,
the amount of new information plateaus and after a certain amount of time, no
new information is gathered. Indeed, nmap actually finishes its scan while lanmap
continues to report new items. lanmap discovers more services initially and discovers
fewer and fewer new items as time goes on.
5.3 Conclusions
Accurate data is necessary for generating a network map. Both active and
passive mapping methods provide the information to generate a relatively accurate
network map. In the case of nmap, only the server-side services are discovered and
not the clients which used them. On the other hand, lanmap captured more and
varied information about the network, specifically services offered and consumed,
but was unable to detect those unused services that nmap discovered. Neither tool
discovered the entire network, but lanmap discovered more.
nmap creates much more overhead network traffic than lanmap. Conversely,
lanmap is more difficult to implement in a real environment. Setting up network
switches with SPAN ports or using unswitched hubs at network choke points requires
extra work and maintenance on the part of the network administrator. nmap needs
nothing more than a network connection and an IP address. lanmap does not need
the IP address, but requires more network support to function.
If a network administrator requires a method to map a network without adding
traffic to the network, a passive mapping system such as lanmap would do well as
long as the network management overhead was tolerable. Passive mapping would find
more server- and client-side services being provided and used than active mapping.
If, however, it is more important to find all the network services being provided,
nmap or another active scanner would be more appropriate.
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5.4 Future Research
5.4.1 lanmap and collector. The lanmap program operates nearly as de-
signed. However, the delayed, random output needs to be implemented. The desire
to buffer output to maintain a certain level of stealth failed, at least during the first
minute of running. First and foremost, lanmap needs to discover the IP range of the
given network so that it can determine the difference between inside traffic (traffic
only traversing the “internal” network) and inside-outside traffic (traffic originating
or destined for external networks).
Finally, the ability of the system to leverage information from other network
devices is needed to complete the tool. In a well-maintained network, an exiting
packet would need to (appear to) be sent from an authorized system. lanmap can
watch the network and determine which hosts are communicating with systems out-
side of the known network. When a host successfully communicates with an outside
source, lanmap can send its information to the collector outside of the local network.
The collector program should be able to draw a network diagram to aid a network
administrator.
5.4.2 Flow- versus Sniffer-Based System. lanmap uses a sniffer-based ap-
proach in discovering information about the network. One consideration at the
beginning of this research was to use NetFlow or similar data to discover the net-
work [10]. It would be interesting to see the results of a similar comparison between
active, passive-sniffer and passive-flow methods of information gathering.
5.4.3 syntraf. syntraf might be a useful tool at a research institution.
However, it needs to be more robust and provide more traffic generation options
such as Poisson- and exponentially-distributed data. Further research could make
this tool into a full-fledged system.
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5.4.4 Network Loading. The systems used for this research were modest
as were the network loads. This was by design to test if a passive mapper was a
viable solution. However, if the passive mapper is incorporated into operational
network systems, it would encounter real network loading and could be inundated
with network traffic. If the system running lanmap (or similar tool) is not adequate
to the task, vital information may be lost. Further research could determine what
the bounds for a sniffer-based mapping system on given system platforms and what
system improvements would be needed to get there [21,22].
5.4.5 ARP Poisoning. Using ARP poisoning techniques, it would be pos-
sible for the passive mapper to see traffic without the need to configure a SPAN (or
equivalent) port on a network switch. However, once the mapper begins to receive
that traffic, it suddenly becomes an active member of the network, receiving and
forwarding packets. This technique was not used as it does not meet the definition
of a purely passive mapper, but could be implemented as a follow-on project. Inte-
grating ARP poisoning into this system might negate the need for control over the
network infrastructure.
5.4.6 Combining Active and Passive Techniques. Since using either tech-
nique by itself did not discover more than 72.6% of the total number of configured
items, it might be interesting to see how the two techniques would fair if used to-
gether. An active probe could elicit response from an quiet service-provider while
the passive sensor would make note of the result.
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Appendix A. Gathered Data
This appendix contains the full data-set gathered during the experimentation phase
of this investigation.
Traffic Time Time Server Client Packets Packets
Scenario Method Pattern Given Used Disc. Disc. In Out
Firewall Active 1 0.5 0.5 1 0 37 4965
Firewall Active 1 0.5 0.5 0 0 35 4964
Firewall Active 1 0.5 0.5 0 0 35 4998
Firewall Active 2 0.5 0.5 0 0 36 4342
Firewall Active 2 0.5 0.5 1 0 36 4999
Firewall Active 2 0.5 0.5 0 0 35 4998
Firewall Active 4 0.5 0.5 0 0 35 4998
Firewall Active 4 0.5 0.5 0 0 35 4998
Firewall Active 4 0.5 0.5 0 0 35 4968
Firewall Active 1 1 1 1 0 37 7741
Firewall Active 1 1 1 1 0 37 7735
Firewall Active 1 1 1 1 0 37 7741
Firewall Active 2 1 1 1 0 37 7741
Firewall Active 2 1 1 1 0 37 7735
Firewall Active 2 1 1 1 0 37 7741
Firewall Active 4 1 1 1 0 37 7741
Firewall Active 4 1 1 1 0 37 7741
Firewall Active 4 1 1 1 0 36 7743
Firewall Active 1 5 5 8 0 46 29944
Firewall Active 1 5 5 6 0 52 26792
Firewall Active 1 5 5 8 0 45 29866
Firewall Active 2 5 5 8 0 45 29920
Firewall Active 2 5 5 8 0 45 29956
Firewall Active 2 5 5 8 0 45 29956
Firewall Active 4 5 5 8 0 45 29922
Firewall Active 4 5 5 8 0 47 29112
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Traffic Time Time Server Client Packets Packets
Scenario Method Pattern Given Used Disc. Disc. In Out
Firewall Active 4 5 5 8 0 46 26886
Firewall Active 1 10 10 35 0 73 57707
Firewall Active 1 10 10 35 0 73 55445
Firewall Active 1 10 10 35 0 72 57796
Firewall Active 2 10 10 35 0 75 57531
Firewall Active 2 10 10 35 0 74 53533
Firewall Active 2 10 10 36 0 73 57761
Firewall Active 4 10 10 35 0 73 55605
Firewall Active 4 10 10 35 0 73 56748
Firewall Active 4 10 10 35 0 73 55699
Firewall Active 1 40 36.85 126 0 167 197795
Firewall Active 1 40 40 126 0 169 194561
Firewall Active 1 40 35.991 126 0 165 197735
Firewall Active 2 40 37.078 118 0 157 183137
Firewall Active 2 40 35.679 126 0 165 197805
Firewall Active 2 40 40 126 0 165 197737
Firewall Active 4 40 36.543 126 0 167 197741
Firewall Active 4 40 40 126 0 165 194155
Firewall Active 4 40 36.169 126 0 164 197792
Firewall Passive 1 0.5 0.5 23 131 7579 48
Firewall Passive 1 0.5 0.5 23 131 7341 56
Firewall Passive 1 0.5 0.5 23 131 7053 49
Firewall Passive 2 0.5 0.5 24 124 7174 55
Firewall Passive 2 0.5 0.5 24 124 7241 50
Firewall Passive 2 0.5 0.5 24 124 7197 54
Firewall Passive 4 0.5 0.5 19 105 7030 39
Firewall Passive 4 0.5 0.5 19 105 6930 40
Firewall Passive 4 0.5 0.5 19 105 6821 39
Firewall Passive 1 1 1 23 185 14936 77
Firewall Passive 1 1 1 23 184 13907 77
Firewall Passive 1 1 1 23 188 14064 84
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Traffic Time Time Server Client Packets Packets
Scenario Method Pattern Given Used Disc. Disc. In Out
Firewall Passive 2 1 1 26 187 13665 86
Firewall Passive 2 1 1 26 186 13759 85
Firewall Passive 2 1 1 26 186 14202 78
Firewall Passive 4 1 1 23 159 13933 67
Firewall Passive 4 1 1 24 159 13517 70
Firewall Passive 4 1 1 24 159 13236 61
Firewall Passive 1 5 5 27 281 68260 163
Firewall Passive 1 5 5 27 282 67212 160
Firewall Passive 1 5 5 27 282 67647 159
Firewall Passive 2 5 5 27 289 65951 174
Firewall Passive 2 5 5 27 289 65619 166
Firewall Passive 2 5 5 27 289 65668 176
Firewall Passive 4 5 5 26 284 68178 170
Firewall Passive 4 5 5 26 284 66228 159
Firewall Passive 4 5 5 26 284 65559 168
Firewall Passive 1 10 10 27 311 134147 199
Firewall Passive 1 10 10 27 311 132789 187
Firewall Passive 1 10 10 27 311 132935 185
Firewall Passive 2 10 10 27 314 130808 181
Firewall Passive 2 10 10 27 314 132477 190
Firewall Passive 2 10 10 27 314 132657 187
Firewall Passive 4 10 10 26 306 134333 191
Firewall Passive 4 10 10 26 306 134028 198
Firewall Passive 4 10 10 26 306 134312 191
Firewall Passive 1 40 40 27 321 536814 188
Firewall Passive 1 40 40 27 321 530565 192
Firewall Passive 1 40 40 27 321 531169 195
Firewall Passive 2 40 40 27 321 530922 201
Firewall Passive 2 40 40 27 321 531105 196
Firewall Passive 2 40 40 27 321 533250 201
Firewall Passive 4 40 40 27 321 533341 206
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Traffic Time Time Server Client Packets Packets
Scenario Method Pattern Given Used Disc. Disc. In Out
Firewall Passive 4 40 40 27 321 530624 212
Firewall Passive 4 40 40 27 321 529295 202
Normal Active 1 0.5 0.5 2 0 3374 8252
Normal Active 1 0.5 0.5 2 0 3239 7946
Normal Active 1 0.5 0.5 2 0 3374 8162
Normal Active 2 0.5 0.5 2 0 3374 8192
Normal Active 2 0.5 0.5 2 0 3043 7913
Normal Active 2 0.5 0.5 2 0 3459 8210
Normal Active 4 0.5 0.5 2 0 3373 8192
Normal Active 4 0.5 0.5 2 0 3332 8201
Normal Active 4 0.5 0.5 2 0 3374 8156
Normal Active 1 1 1 2 0 3104 9673
Normal Active 1 1 1 2 0 3390 11576
Normal Active 1 1 1 2 0 3374 10966
Normal Active 2 1 1 2 0 3374 10996
Normal Active 2 1 1 2 0 3292 10759
Normal Active 2 1 1 2 0 3373 10966
Normal Active 4 1 1 2 0 3372 10996
Normal Active 4 1 1 2 0 3373 10995
Normal Active 4 1 1 2 0 3373 10966
Normal Active 1 5 5 67 0 22227 40051
Normal Active 1 5 5 67 0 22354 40240
Normal Active 1 5 5 68 0 22928 40810
Normal Active 2 5 5 70 0 23432 41379
Normal Active 2 5 5 72 0 24526 42427
Normal Active 2 5 5 70 0 23674 41577
Normal Active 4 5 5 74 0 25053 42962
Normal Active 4 5 5 69 0 23925 41827
Normal Active 4 5 5 68 0 22816 40688
Normal Active 1 10 8.32 127 0 44798 69706
Normal Active 1 10 8.282 127 0 44802 69746
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Traffic Time Time Server Client Packets Packets
Scenario Method Pattern Given Used Disc. Disc. In Out
Normal Active 1 10 8.17 127 0 44659 69564
Normal Active 2 10 8.375 127 0 44800 69723
Normal Active 2 10 8.118 127 0 44801 69671
Normal Active 2 10 8.213 127 0 44494 69446
Normal Active 4 10 8.175 127 0 44829 69711
Normal Active 4 10 8.25 127 0 44800 69671
Normal Active 4 10 8.234 127 0 44801 69725
Normal Active 1 40 8.237 127 0 44753.78 69662.56
Normal Active 1 40 8.237 127 0 44753.78 69662.56
Normal Active 1 40 8.237 127 0 44753.78 69662.56
Normal Active 2 40 8.237 127 0 44753.78 69662.56
Normal Active 2 40 8.237 127 0 44753.78 69662.56
Normal Active 2 40 8.237 127 0 44753.78 69662.56
Normal Active 4 40 8.237 127 0 44753.78 69662.56
Normal Active 4 40 8.237 127 0 44753.78 69662.56
Normal Active 4 40 8.237 127 0 44753.78 69662.56
Normal Passive 1 0.5 0.5 26 149 7955 58
Normal Passive 1 0.5 0.5 26 147 8086 51
Normal Passive 1 0.5 0.5 26 149 7929 53
Normal Passive 2 0.5 0.5 25 137 7880 56
Normal Passive 2 0.5 0.5 25 138 7939 53
Normal Passive 2 0.5 0.5 25 138 7888 56
Normal Passive 4 0.5 0.5 21 115 7912 44
Normal Passive 4 0.5 0.5 21 115 8031 44
Normal Passive 4 0.5 0.5 21 115 7864 49
Normal Passive 1 1 1 26 202 15878 84
Normal Passive 1 1 1 26 202 15965 80
Normal Passive 1 1 1 26 205 15935 88
Normal Passive 2 1 1 27 203 14894 85
Normal Passive 2 1 1 27 203 14941 87
Normal Passive 2 1 1 27 204 15627 92
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Traffic Time Time Server Client Packets Packets
Scenario Method Pattern Given Used Disc. Disc. In Out
Normal Passive 4 1 1 26 175 15581 72
Normal Passive 4 1 1 26 174 15138 73
Normal Passive 4 1 1 26 175 15189 75
Normal Passive 1 5 5 27 294 72805 173
Normal Passive 1 5 5 27 295 75351 175
Normal Passive 1 5 5 27 295 74870 169
Normal Passive 2 5 5 27 304 73626 178
Normal Passive 2 5 5 27 304 74756 184
Normal Passive 2 5 5 27 304 74702 175
Normal Passive 4 5 5 27 301 74707 182
Normal Passive 4 5 5 27 300 72553 183
Normal Passive 4 5 5 27 301 74574 185
Normal Passive 1 10 10 27 317 146112 196
Normal Passive 1 10 10 27 317 146206 192
Normal Passive 1 10 10 27 317 146117 188
Normal Passive 2 10 10 27 319 146154 198
Normal Passive 2 10 10 27 319 146272 201
Normal Passive 2 10 10 27 319 146855 204
Normal Passive 4 10 10 27 318 145792 201
Normal Passive 4 10 10 27 318 146897 205
Normal Passive 4 10 10 27 318 144623 201
Normal Passive 1 40 40 27 321 580291 200
Normal Passive 1 40 40 27 321 583866 199
Normal Passive 1 40 40 27 321 584611 200
Normal Passive 2 40 40 27 321 586542 197
Normal Passive 2 40 40 27 321 585933 193
Normal Passive 2 40 40 27 321 582133 198
Normal Passive 4 40 40 27 321 583057 199
Normal Passive 4 40 40 27 321 584764 197
Normal Passive 4 40 40 27 321 584585 208
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Appendix B. Data Analysis Charts
B.1 Traffic Pattern Analysis
Table B.1: 95% CI on Log Client Discoveries by Traffic Pattern
Estimator Pattern Estimate Lower CI Upper CI
Mean 1 1.190 0.879 1.501
2 1.188 0.878 1.499
4 1.173 0.865 1.480
Std Dev 1 1.204 1.020 1.468
2 1.203 1.020 1.468
4 1.190 1.009 1.452
Table B.2: 95% CI on Log Server Discoveries by Traffic Pattern
Estimator Pattern Estimate Lower CI Upper CI
Mean 1 1.264 1.100 1.429
2 1.271 1.106 1.435
4 1.257 1.094 1.421
Std Dev 1 0.636 0.539 0.779
2 0.636 0.539 0.775
4 0.634 0.537 0.773
Table B.3: 95% CI on Log Packets In by Traffic Pattern
Estimator Pattern Estimate Lower CI Upper CI
Mean 1 3.859 3.508 4.210
2 3.856 3.504 4.208
4 3.856 3.504 4.208
Std Dev 1 1.359 1.152 1.658
2 1.361 1.153 1.660
4 1.361 1.154 1.660
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Table B.4: 95% CI on Log Packets Out by Traffic Pattern
Estimator Pattern Estimate Lower CI Upper CI
Mean 1 3.259 2.937 3.581
2 3.266 2.945 3.586
4 3.249 2.923 3.575
Std Dev 1 1.247 1.057 1.521
2 1.241 1.052 1.513
4 1.263 1.071 1.540
B.2 Effects Tests for Response Variables
Table B.5: Effects Test for Log Client Discoveries (α = 0.05)
Source Nparm DF SS F Ratio Prob > F
Method 1 1 252.170 760001.357 4.53E-296
Time Given*Method 4 4 1.146 863.325 3.86E-107
Time Given 4 4 1.146 863.325 3.86E-107
Scenario*Method 1 1 0.006 18.945 2.39E-005
Scenario 1 1 0.006 18.946 2.39E-005
Time Given*Scenario 4 4 0.003 2.517 4.35E-002
Time Given*Scenario*Method 4 4 0.003 2.517 4.35E-002
Table B.6: Effects Test for Log Server Discoveries (α = 0.05)
Source Nparm DF SS F Ratio Prob > F
Time Given 4 4 32.334 23486.751 2.23E-220
Time Given*Method 4 4 28.895 20988.414 1.77E-216
Method 1 1 3.829 11124.780 8.56E-150
Scenario 1 1 2.188 6357.945 1.01E-130
Scenario*Method 1 1 1.860 5405.586 3.12E-125
Time Given*Scenario 4 4 1.106 803.682 9.08E-105
Time Given*Scenario*Method 4 4 1.157 840.224 3.06E-010
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Table B.7: Effects Test for Log Packets In (α = 0.05)
Source Nparm DF SS F Ratio Prob > F
Method 1 1 145.536 1438839.450 0
Scenario 1 1 65.585 648407.756 1.49E-290
Scenario*Method 1 1 60.915 602238.296 5.47E-288
Time Given 4 4 48.103 118892.467 1.12E-276
Time Given*Method 4 4 4.617 11410.679 2.32E-195
Time Given*Scenario 4 4 1.382 3415.676 9.68E-154
Time Given*Scenario*Method 4 4 1.404 3469.597 2.80E-154
Table B.8: Effects Test for Log Packets Out (α = 0.05)
Source Nparm DF SS F Ratio Prob > F
Method 1 1 248.825 385675.206 1.65E-272
Time Given 4 4 23.336 9042.411 2.60E-187
Time Given*Method 4 4 3.065 1187.500 8.66E-118
Time Given*Scenario 4 4 0.738 285.820 9.53E-072
Time Given*Scenario*Method 4 4 0.600 232.681 1.42E-065
Scenario 1 1 0.0352 54.498 8.03E-012
Scenario*Method 1 1 0.001 1.436 2.33E-001
B.3 Effects Tests for Derived Metrics
Table B.9: Effects Test for Log Total Discoveries (α = 0.05)
Source Nparm DF SS F Ratio Prob > F
Method 1 1 75.623 185190.932 4.89E-247
Time Given 4 4 41.490 25401.171 4.26E-223
Time Given*Method 4 4 21.561 13199.974 2.09E-200
Scenario 1 1 2.246 5499.876 8.14E-126
Scenario*Method 1 1 1.808 4427.709 1.62E-118
Time Given*Scenario 4 4 1.141 698.388 3.86E-100
Time Given*Scenario*Method 4 4 1.123 687.270 1.30E-099
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Table B.10: Effects Test for Log Overhead Packets In (α = 0.05)
Source Nparm DF SS F Ratio Prob > F
Method 1 1 393.702 5861006.280 0
Scenario 1 1 63.229 941280.880 1.68E-303
Scenario*Method 1 1 63.229 941280.880 1.68E-303
Time Given 4 4 6.020 22403.433 9.67E-219
Time Given*Method 4 4 6.017 22403.433 9.67E-219
Time Given*Scenario 4 4 1.393 5183.557 4.29E-168
Time Given*Scenario*Method 4 4 1.393 5183.557 4.29E-168
Table B.11: Effects Test for Log Total Network Overhead (α = 0.05)
Source Nparm DF SS F Ratio Prob > F
Method 1 1 268.191 415453.623 4.30E-275
Time Given 4 4 24.471 9477.083 6.18E-189
Time Given*Method 4 4 3.479 1347.445 4.83E-122
Scenario 1 1 0.610 944.206 5.23E-069
Time Given*Scenario 4 4 0.626 242.331 8.85E-067
Time Given*Scenario*Method 4 4 0.505 195.732 1.59E-060
Scenario*Method 1 1 0.389 602.493 3.98E-056
B.4 Comparison by Method at Time=40
Table B.12: 95% CI on Log Server Discoveries by Method (Time=40)
Estimator Method Estimate Lower CI Upper CI
Mean Active 2.101 2.097 2.104
Passive 1.431 1.431 1.431
Std Dev Active 0.007 0.006 0.011
Passive 0 0 0
Table B.13: 95% CI on Log Client Discoveries by Method (Time=40)
Estimator Method Estimate Lower CI Upper CI
Mean Active 0 0 0
Passive 2.507 2.507 2.507
Std Dev Active 0 0 0
Passive 0 0 0
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Table B.14: 95% CI on Log Total Discoveries by Method (Time=40)
Estimator Method Estimate Lower CI Upper CI
Mean Active 2.101 2.097 2.104
Passive 2.542 2.542 2.542
Std Dev Active 0.007 0.006 0.011
Passive 0 0 0
Table B.15: 95% CI on Log Overhead Packets In by Method (Time=40)
Estimator Method Estimate Lower CI Upper CI
Mean Active 3.434 2.811 4.057
Passive 0 0 0
Std Dev Active 1.252 0.940 1.877
Passive 0 0 0
Table B.16: 95% CI on Log Overhead Packets Out by Method (Time=40)
Estimator Method Estimate Lower CI Upper CI
Mean Active 5.067 4.952 5.182
Passive 2.299 2.293 2.305
Std Dev Active 0.231 0.173 0.346
Passive 0.012 0.009 0.019
Table B.17: 95% CI on Log Total Network Overhead by Method (Time=40)
Estimator Method Estimate Lower CI Upper CI
Mean Active 5.175 5.115 5.234
Passive 2.299 2.293 2.305
Std Dev Active 0.120 0.090 0.180
Passive 0.012 0.009 0.019
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Appendix C. Source Code and Configuration Files
The smaller, simpler source code files are listed here. The larger configuration and

















next if /mapped items/;
next if /received/;
next if /Done/;
($ip, $eth, $sports, $cports, $uports)
= m/^(.*) (.*) S\((.*)\) C\((.*)\) U\((.*)\)$/ ;
if (length($sports)>0) {
@ports = split (" ", $sports);




if (length ($cports) >0) {
@ports = split (" ", $cports);





@ports = split (" ", $uports);









# normalize the output of the nmap ’grep’ format log for input to matchem
# only server-side ports are seen by nmap so no client-side processing













($ip, $sports, $dummy) =
m/^Host:\s+(.*)\s+\(\)\s+Ports:\s+(.*)(\s+Ignore.*|\#.*)$/;
if ($sports) {
foreach $j (split (/,\s+/, $sports)) {
($port, $status, $proto, $dummy) = split (’\/’, $j);
if ($status =~ /open/i) {











C.1.3 matchem.java. The source code for matchem is provided on a data
CD-ROM and can be found under the matchem directory at filename matchem.java.
C.1.4 syntraf. The source code for syntraf is provided on a data CD-ROM
and can be found under the syntraf directory.
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C.1.5 lanmap and collector. The project files and source code for lanmap
and collector are provided on a data CD-ROM and can be found under the lanmap
directory.
C.1.6 nmap modifications. The differential file describing this investiga-
tion’s modifications to nmap is provided on a data CD-ROM and can be found under
the nmap directory at filename nmap-timer.diff.
C.2 Configuration Files
C.2.1 honeyd configuration. The honeyd configuration files for the “Nor-
mal” and “Firewall” scenario is provided on a data CD-ROM and can be found
under the configs directory. scenario1.travis.cfg provides the Firewall scenario and
scenario2.travis.cfg provides the Normal scenario.
C.2.2 syntraf configuration. The syntraf configuration file used throughout
the experiments is provided on a data CD-ROM and can be found under the configs
directory, at filename travis.scn.
C.3 Experiment System
Figure C.1 describes the experimental cycle.
power up all systems (switch, four computers)
login to the collector (the only system with user console)
ensure switch SPAN is set up correctly
for active, sniffer/collector needs SPAN emitter
for passive, mapper needs SPAN emitter)
remotely login to the other three systems
ensure each systems secondary network adapter is enabled
for a passive test:
login a second time to mapper
on the honeynet: ./honeyd -i eth0 10.0.0.0/8 -f firewall.scenario.cfg
on the collector: ./collector > collector.log
on the mapper: tcpdump -i eth0 ip or arp -w sniffer.tcpdump
on the second mapper login: ./lanmap -i eth0 -s <address of collector> > lanmap.log
on the generator: java syntraf -t <time> -f traffic.scn
for an active test:
login a second time to mapper
on the honeynet: ./honeyd -i eth0 10.0.0.0/8 -f firewall.scenario.cfg
on the sniffer: tcpdump -i eth0 ip or arp -w snifferlog.tcpdump
on the mapper: tcpdump -i eth0 ip or arp -w nmaplog.tcpdump
on the generator: java syntraf -t <time> -f traffic.scn
immediately on the second mapper login:
nmap -i eth0 ’network addresses’ -n -oG nmaplog.grep
Figure C.1: Experiment System Configuration
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Appendix D. Availability of Source Code and Configuration Files
Availability of source code and projet files for lanmap, collector, and syntraf ; dif-
ferential files describing the modifications to nmap; and the configuration files for
honeyd and syntraf are not included as part of this document.
Interested parties should direct their inquiries to:
Dr. Richard Raines
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